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Abstract 
 
In the continuing discussion on migration and development, the vulnerability of all migrant 
groups to exploitation and mistreatment in host countries has been highlighted along with an 
emphasis on protecting their rights. However, xenophobia has not yet received explicit attention 
although anti-migrant sentiments and practices are clearly on the rise even in receiving countries 
in developing regions. Despite gaps in existing empirical work, research and anecdotal evidence 
exposes pervasive forms of discrimination, hostility, and violence experienced by migrant 
communities, with the latter becoming easy scapegoats for various social problems in host 
countries. This study attempts to insert xenophobia in this debate on migration and development 
by examining the growth of this phenomenon in host countries in the South. It provides short 
accounts of xenophobia witnessed in recent times in five countries including South Africa, India, 
Malaysia, Libya, and Thailand. The ambiguity surrounding the concept is discussed and crucial 
features that define xenophobia are outlined. A variety of methods to study it are likewise 
identified. Using a wide range of examples from diverse contexts, the paper explores possible 
reasons for the intensification of xenophobia. The final sections of the paper briefly outline the 
developmental consequences of rampant xenophobia for migrant and host populations while 
examining policy options to tackle it. 
 
Keywords: Xenophobia; anti-immigrant prejudice; violence; intolerance; social exclusion; 
discrimination; migrant vulnerability; policy; South Africa, India, Libya, Thailand, Malaysia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series is a medium for sharing recent 
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published 
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as 
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and 
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations 
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of 
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that 
presented in Human Development Reports. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
According to the IOM, the number of international migrants very likely reached 
200 million in 2008, more than double the figure in 1965.
1
 As the number of migrants 
continues to grow, the character of international migration has been transformed, with 
many sending countries now becoming receivers and transit points for international 
migrants. This holds true especially for numerous developing countries that have become 
destinations for migrants from other developing and low-income countries. South-South 
migration, as it is now commonly referred to, is acquiring ever-greater significance in 
contemporary migration configurations. This is confirmed in a current World Bank report 
that suggests a shift from North-South to South-South migration with several developing 
countries like India, Côte d‘Ivoire, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan now 
appearing in the list of top receivers worldwide.
2
  
 
In 2005, there were an estimated 78 million migrants residing in developing 
countries of the South. In terms of the global stock of migrants, two out of every five 
migrants were residents of countries in the South.
3
  The World Bank estimates that 
international migration between countries in the South may now be almost as high as 
North-South migrations.
4
  The share may be even higher if irregular and informal flows, 
which are an important feature of South-South migrations, are taken into consideration.
5
 
Weak and unreliable databases on bilateral flows (especially between countries that share 
contiguous borders and within regions) and the informal, and to some extent circular, 
                                                 
1
 IOM 2008 World Migration 2008: Managing Labor Mobility in the Evolving Global Economy, 
International Organization of Migration: Geneva 
2
 World Bank 2009 World Development Report 2009: Reshaping Economic Geography, World Bank: 
Washington DC, pp. 150-151  
3
 It must be acknowledged that different databases provide somewhat varying figures for international 
migration. As per the revised estimates for 2005 World Migrant Stock calculated by the United Nations 
Population Division, there were some 75 million and 114 million migrants in more and less developed 
regions respectively. See Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the 
United Nations Secretariat 2006 ‗Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2005 Revision‘, (Internet source: 
http://esa.un.org/migration, Last accessed 13 February 2009)   
4
 Ratha, Dilip and William Shaw 2007 South-South Migration and Remittances, Working Paper No. 102, 
World Bank: Washington DC    
5
 Ratha, Dilip and William Shaw 2007 ‗South-South migration and remittances‘, Migration Information 
Source, September 4, www.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/print.cfm?ID=641 (Last accessed December 
2008) 
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nature of South-South migrations also make assessment difficult and incomplete.
6
 All the 
same, there are strong indications that flows between countries, and within regions, of the 
South, are a noteworthy aspect of the contemporary global migration system. Ninety 
percent of the flows into India, for instance, are from neighbouring countries. Other 
countries like Côte d‘Ivoire and Hong Kong receive 80 percent of migrants from in the 
region. Pakistan receives the largest number of migrants from nearby Bangladesh.  In 
Sub-Saharan Africa, more than 60 percent of migrants move to other countries within the 
region.
7
 Similarly in South Asia, more than half of the migrants move to neighbouring 
countries or to other developing countries.
8
  
 
Over the past two decades migration to Western and Eastern Europe has been 
accompanied by growing resentment of immigrants and refugees.  The nature, causes and 
consequences of anti-immigrant and refugee sentiment and actions have been extensively 
documented.  While anti-migrant sentiment continues to be strongly entrenched in the 
West, it is increasingly evident in developing countries as well. The present-day surge in 
intolerance and xenophobia in developing countries has been inadequately studied and 
documented. However, information from advocacy groups and anecdotal evidence 
presents a grim scenario. Ironically, developing countries whose citizens experienced and 
continue to face poor treatment in traditional-immigration countries in the West are now 
witnessing and often legitimizing the exploitation of migrants from other poor countries.   
 
As in the West, resentment of migrants and xenophobic action in the global South 
is not a new phenomenon. The expulsion of 800,000 Ghanaians from Nigeria in the 
1980s, for example, was a clear early example of a people and government who had 
become increasingly inhospitable towards migrants from another African country.  
However, intolerance does appear to have become more widespread and intense as 
South-South migration has increased. 
                                                 
6
 Parsons, Christopher et al 2007 ‗Quantifying international migration: a database of bilateral migrant 
stocks‘ in Ozden, Caglar and Maurice Schiff (eds) International Migration, Economic Development and 
Policy, Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 17-58; See also Ratha and Shaw 
2007  
7
 World Bank 2009 World Development Report 2009, p. 151-52 
8
 Ibid 
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The contemporary resurgence of intolerance and xenophobia presents a 
formidable challenge to policy-makers and states. There can be no doubt that xenophobia 
destabilizes and seriously undermines the potentially beneficial relationship between 
international migration and human development.  It acts as one of the major obstacles to 
maximizing the economic and social benefits of international migration, affecting both 
migrant and host populations adversely in many different ways. Escalated levels of 
xenophobia towards migrants and refugees directly contribute to the vulnerability and 
exploitation of these groups leading to marked inequalities in the long-term between 
migrant and non-migrant populations. In a broader sense, xenophobia undermines 
principles of human equality, social justice, and social cohesion.   
 
Recent international forums on migration and development have consistently 
highlighted the need to tackle xenophobia and the related political, economic, and social 
exclusion of migrants, immigrants, and refugees. On July 7-11, 2007, participants at the 
first meeting of the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) in Belgium 
underscored the urgency of developing new initiatives to counter xenophobia and racism 
as well as the marginalization, abuse and discrimination faced by migrant groups.
9
 The 
forum further emphasized the need for action to protect the fundamental rights of 
migrants. The second meeting of the GFMD in Manila at the end of October 2008 
renewed this message in its adopted slogan: ‗protecting and empowering migrants for 
development.‘ In 2004, the United Nations Commission for Social Development had 
earlier strongly identified the ‗exploitation, discrimination, xenophobia and racism 
towards immigrants [as] scourges‘.10 The High-Level Dialogue on International 
Migration and Development at the UN General Assembly on 14-15 September 2006 
urged receiving countries to protect migrants against discrimination, racism and 
xenophobia by introducing effective measures to counter migrant abuse.  
 
                                                 
9
 GFMD 2007 Report on the First Meeting of the Global Forum on Migration and Development, Brussels, 
July 9-11 
10
 United Nations Commission for Social Development 2004 ‗Chairman‘s summary of panel discussion on 
‗international migration and migrants from a social perspective‘‘, United Nations Commission for Social 
Development, Forty-second session, 4-13 February 
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In 2005, the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) 
recommended the strengthening of legal and normative frameworks that would allow 
migrant groups to exercise their fundamental human rights.
11
 The Commission also urged 
local authorities, migrant groups and other non-state actors to promote social cohesion 
and the integration of immigrants.  Nevertheless, as the 2008 UN ESCAP Economic and 
Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific pointed out, despite the growth in international 
migration, migrant rights remain at the ‗fringes of discussion.‘12 The protection of 
migrant rights continues to be a key point in recent debates on migration and 
development although xenophobia per se has not received detailed attention.   
 
How does xenophobia influence the relationship between international migration 
and human development? In this paper, we examine these connections with an emphasis 
on South-South migration. The paper has been divided into five sections. The first section 
provides a working definition of xenophobia and summarizes the methods by which it 
can be measured and assessed. The second section reviews various approaches to 
explaining the phenomenon of xenophobia. Examples from a variety of developing and 
developed country contexts are provided to illustrate these approaches. The third section 
provides some case studies of developing countries from different parts of the world that 
have experienced egreguious xenophobic violence or violations of the basic rights of 
migrants and refugees in recent years. The last two sections of this paper examine the 
consequences of xenophobia for host and migrant populations as well as policy responses 
to xenophobia. 
 
DEFINING AND MEASURING XENOPHOBIA 
 
Despite its widespread usage, xenophobia remains an ambiguous term. It is 
derived from the Greek words ‗xenos‘ and ‗phobos‘ which correspondingly mean 
‗strange or foreign‘ and ‗phobia.‘ In the Concise Oxford Dictionary, xenophobia is 
                                                 
11
 GCIM 2005 Migration in an Inter-Connected World: New Directions for Action (Report of the Global 
Commission on International Migration), GCIM: Geneva 
12
 UN ESCAP 2008 Sustaining Growth and Sharing Prosperity: Asia and Pacific Economic and Social 
Survey 2008, UNESCAP: Bangkok 
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defined as a ‗morbid dislike of foreigners.‘ Scholars have conceptualized xenophobia in a 
number of ways. Berezin defines xenophobia as the ‗fear of difference embodied in 
persons or groups.‘13 For Nyamnjoh, xenophobia is the ‗intense dislike, hatred or fear of 
Others.‘14 It has been characterized as ‗an attitudinal orientation of hostility against non-
natives in a given population.‘15 And, it has been seen as ‗hostility towards strangers and 
all that is foreign.‘16 Another definition views xenophobia as ‗attitudes, prejudices, and 
behaviour that reject, exclude and often vilify persons based on the perception that they 
are outsiders or foreigners to the community, society or national identity.‘17 
 
In some explanations, this prejudice extends towards non-citizens and other 
marginal groups. It can also be directed toward other ethnic minorities, including third or 
fourth generation descendants of immigrants. Another point of confusion is that 
xenophobia has been closely tied to racism and persists in newer characterizations of 
racism. Described as ‗new racism,‘ ‗differential racism,‘ or ‗cultural racism,‘ cultural 
rather than racial differences become the basis of exclusion in newer forms.
18
 For others, 
xenophobia, unlike racism and nationalism, is a spontaneous, ‗natural‘ biological reaction 
to strangers. Defined in such terms, xenophobia becomes a ubiquitous phenomenon 
which is difficult to challenge or confront. A variety of other terms to describe 
xenophobia have been developed including  ‗nativism,‘ ethnocentrism, ‗xeno-racism,‘19 
                                                 
13
 Berezin, Mabel 2006 ‗Xenophobia and the new nationalisms‘ in Gerard Delanty and Krishna Kumar 
(eds) The SAGE Handbook of Nations and Nationalism, Sage: London, p. 273 
14
 Nyamnjoh, Francis 2006 Insiders and Outsiders: Citizenship and Xenophobia in Contemporary Southern 
Africa, CODESRIA and Zed Books: Dakar, London and New York, p. 5. 
15
 ILO, IOM and OHCHR 2001 ‗International migration, racism, discrimination and xenophobia‘, Paper for 
the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance 
(WCAR), August 
16
 Stolcke, Verena 1999 ‗New rhetorics of exclusion in Europe‘, International Social Science Journal, 51 
(159), p. 28  
17
 ILO, IOM and OHCHR 2001 ‗International migration, racism, discrimination and xenophobia‘ 
18
 Delanty, Gerard and Peter Millward 2007 ‗Post-liberal anxieties and discourse of peoplehood in Europe: 
nationalism, xenophobia and racism‘ in Mole, Richard C M (ed.) Discursive Constructions of Identity in 
European Politics, Palgrave Macmillan: Houndsmill, pp. 137-48; See also Kundnani, Arun 2001 ‗In a 
foreign land: the new popular racism‘, Race & Class, 43 (2), pp. 41-60 
19
 Fekete, Liz 2001 ‗The emergence of xeno-racism‘, Race & Class, 43 (2), pp. 23-40 
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‗ethno-exclusionism,‘20 ‗anti-immigrant prejudice,‘21 ‗the immigrant threat‘22 and 
‗immigration-phobia.‘23 
 
In this report, xenophobia is associated with the following: 
 
 Xenophobia consists of highly negative perceptions and practices that 
discriminate against non-citizen groups on the basis of their foreign origin or 
nationality. It affects all categories of migrants, immigrants, refugees, and 
asylum-seekers. Different migrant groups may, however, experience xenophobia 
to varying degrees depending on their cultural, racial and ethnic make-up, class 
composition, and migrant status.   
 Xenophobia is perpetuated through a dynamic public rhetoric that actively 
stigmatizes and vilifies some or all migrant groups by playing up the ‗threat‘ 
posed by their presence and making them scapegoats for social problems. 
 Xenophobia is not simply an attitudinal orientation. Hostile and skewed 
perceptions of migrant groups generally go hand in hand with discriminatory 
practices and poor treatment of such groups. Acts of violence, aggression and 
brutality towards migrant groups represent extreme and escalated forms of 
xenophobia. 
 Xenophobia is not a ‗natural‘ response by native populations to the presence of 
foreigners. Like racism and nationalism, it is a social and political phenomenon 
that contributes to the marginalization and/or exclusion of migrant groups in 
social and national settings. 
 Xenophobia is crucially linked to nation-building and nationalism, in particular, 
its aggressive forms. 
                                                 
20
 See Coenders, Marcel, Marcel Lubbers and Peer Scheepers 2003 Overview of Theories, Hypotheses and 
Results on Attitudes of Majorities Towards Minorities (Report 1 of ‗Majorities‘ Attitudes towards 
Minorities‘), EUMC: Vienna 
21
 Mclaren, Lauren M 2003 ‗Anti-immigrant prejudice in Europe‘ 
22
 Lucassen, Leo 2005 The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe 
Since 1850, University of Illinois Press: Urbana and Chicago 
23
 Alexseev, Mikhael 2006 Immigration Phobia and the Security Dilemma: Russia, Europe and the United 
States, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge and New York 
 7 
 Other processes of segregation like racism and exclusionary nationalism can 
often shape xenophobia in distinctive ways, which contributes in part to its 
resilience.  
 The mixed outcomes of immigration for host populations make xenophobia an 
exceptionally difficult and sensitive topic. 
 
INTOLERANCE AND XENOPHOBIA IN THE GLOBAL NORTH 
 
The World Values Survey 2005 found that nearly 40 percent of participants from 
nineteen European countries approved of strict limits on immigration while 42.5 percent 
only supported the entry of immigrants as long as employment was available. Nearly 9 
percent of the respondents endorsed a total ban on immigration. In some countries many 
participants indicated that they would not assist immigrants; they included the Ukraine 
(66 percent), the Russian Federation (55 percent) and the United Kingdom (41 percent).  
In others like the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and France, 14.2 percent, 13.1 
percent and 10.4 percent of respondents respectively supported zero levels of 
immigration.   
 
Longitudinal data from the 1997, 2000, and 2003 Eurobarometer surveys showed 
that 60 percent of respondents believed that the limits to a multi-cultural society had been 
reached, effectively opposing further acceptance of immigrants into their countries.
24
  
Nearly 40 percent of participants opposed civil rights for legal migrants and 22 percent of 
EU respondents endorsed the repatriation of legal immigrants, above all, the unemployed. 
A Special Eurobarometer study conducted in 2003 by the European Opinion Research 
Group in 15 EU countries including Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, 
France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom displayed comparable results.
25
  More than half of the 
respondents (52 percent) disagreed with the statement ‗immigrants contribute a lot to our 
                                                 
24
 Coenders, Marcel, Marcel Lubbers and Peer Scheepers 2003 Majorities’ Attitudes Towards Minorities in 
European Member States: Results from the Standard Eurobarometers 1997-2000-2003 (Report 2), EUMC: 
Vienna 
25
 European Opinion Research Group 2004 Special Eurobarometer: Citizenship and Sense of Belonging, 
European Commission: Brussels 
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economy.‘26 This negative view was most strongly expressed in Belgium where 66 
percent of the population disagreed with the statement.  
 
Results of the European Social Survey (2002-2003) for Western and Eastern 
Europe offer added robust evidence of ethnic exclusionism, a negative stance that 
opposes both immigration and diversity.
27
 Fifty-eight percent of Europeans perceived 
immigrants as a collective threat to economic well-being and cultural identity and one in 
two Europeans displayed open resistance to immigrants. Nearly half of the people living 
in European societies opposed diversity, indicating that they would prefer a mono-
cultural society where a majority of the population shared the same culture. Twenty 
percent of the population wanted to avoid all social interaction with immigrants and 
ethnic minorities residing in their countries. Again, these tendencies were more 
pronounced in selected countries. For example, in Greece and Hungary, resistance to 
immigrants was much higher than that recorded in other European countries. The 
resistance to asylum-seekers was higher in countries like the UK, the Netherlands, 
Belgium and some eastern European countries like Hungary, Slovenia and the former 
East Germany.   
 
Public opinion surveys have shown that many EU citizens hold biased and 
stereotypical views about immigrants and refugees, especially those from non-Western 
countries. According to the 2000 Eurobarometer Survey, 52 percent of participants 
believed that minority groups, including immigrants, have a negative impact on the 
quality of education in their country. Fifty-eight percent of participants from ten 
European countries (namely, Greece, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom, Austria, Luxemburg, Denmark, Italy and Finland) linked migrants with rising 
levels of crime. These tendencies were even more marked in individual EU countries. In 
Greece, an overwhelming 85 percent of respondents in the 2000 Eurobarometer Survey 
accepted that immigrants ‗steal jobs‘ from citizens. In Finland, over a third of those 
                                                 
26
 Ibid, p. 27 
27
 Coenders, Marcel, Marcel Lubbers and Peer Scheepers 2004 Majorities Attitudes Towards Minorities in 
Western and Eastern European Societies: Results from the European Social Survey 2002-2003  (Report 4), 
EUMC: Vienna  
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polled agreed that minority groups exacerbate unemployment rates. Similarly, 81 percent 
of Greeks felt that migrants were more prone to criminal activities compared to non-
migrants. In Ireland, which had the lowest figure for the EU, some 30 percent of 
participants blamed migrants for increasing crime. Likewise, the Special Eurobarometer 
study of 2003 showed that 42 percent of respondents deemed ‗immigrants to be a threat 
to their way of life.‘28 In countries like Greece, the UK and Belgium, 69 percent, 54 
percent and 53 percent respectively agreed with this statement.   
 
These negative attitudes translate into systematic discrimination against migrants 
in their daily lives. A study conducted by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and 
Xenophobia (EUMC) between 2002 and 2005 based on research in individual countries 
like Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and the UK supports this observation.
29
  Some 30 percent 
of participants had faced unfair treatment in employment and 25 percent in education 
while 25 percent had encountered unfair treatment from the police in these countries. The 
results were more skewed for individual countries like Greece, Belgium and Portugal 
where 46 percent, 37 percent, and 32 percent of respondents had experience of being 
treated in a discriminatory manner while seeking employment. Certain groups of 
migrants felt that they were particularly discriminated against in such countries. In 
Belgium, 56 percent of participants of Chinese origin, 29 percent of Congolese origin, 28 
percent of Turkish origin and 26 percent of Moroccan origin, felt that they were subjected 
to discrimination because of their ‗foreign background.‘30 In Greece, migrants from the 
Soviet Union, Romania and Albania felt the most discriminated against, while in France 
and Ireland, African migrants recorded the highest levels of discrimination. Perhaps the 
most disturbing finding of this study is the extreme reluctance of migrants to report such 
acts to authorities, with a staggering 86 percent of those who experienced discrimination 
failing to do so.       
 
                                                 
28
 European Opinion Research Group 2004 Special Eurobarometer: Citizenship and Sense of Belonging, p. 
28 
29
 EUMC/FRA 2006 Migrants’ Experiences of Racism and Xenophobia in 12 EU Member States – Pilot 
Study, European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia: Vienna 
30
 Ibid, p. 8 
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A 2002 UNHCR survey in Moscow revealed that an overwhelming 58 percent of 
Afghan asylum-seekers had been targeted in brutal attacks requiring hospitalization for 
an average of 22 days.
31
 Nearly 80 percent had been attacked with crude weapons like 
metal chains, gas cylinders, bats and beer bottles.
32
 The frequency of xenophobic 
violence was even higher for African refugees, 77 percent of whom reported being 
attacked in the previous month.
33
 Another UNHCR news report suggests that violence 
against African asylum-seekers has become such a routine occurrence in Moscow that 
many of them have opted for third-country resettlement.
34
 A more recent assessment by 
the Moscow Bureau for Human Rights contends that the level of xenophobic violence in 
2007 rose by almost a third compared to the previous year with the number of fatalities 
rising by 20 percent.
35
 The number of victims increased by nearly two times the figure 
recorded for 2006.    
 
Numerous studies have documented the escalation in public violence against 
ethnic minorities in Western Europe during the previous decade. Some of the most high-
profile incidents included arson attacks on residences occupied by asylum-seekers and 
immigrants in places like Lubeck, Hoyerswerda, Rostock and Molln.
36
 In spite of that, 
aggression directed at ethnic minorities persists almost a decade later. In fact, between 
2000 and 2006, as the 2008 Hate Crime Survey notes, eight European Union countries 
experienced an upward trend in recorded racist and xenophobic crimes, including 
Denmark, Germany, France, Ireland, Slovakia, Finland and the United Kingdom.
37
 This 
evidence is alarming especially since many of these countries have long histories of 
racism, xenophobia and discrimination against ethnic minorities. These are also some of 
the countries that, in recent decades, have implemented the strongest anti-discrimination 
measures to counter xenophobia and racism.  
                                                 
31
 Colville, Rupert 2006 ‗The perfect scapegoat‘, Refugees Magazine, 142 (1), pp.  5-8 
32
 Ibid 
33
 Ibid 
34
 UNHCR News Stories  2003 ‗Reaching out to asylum-seekers in Russia‘, 30 May 
35
 Moscow Bureau of Human Rights 2007 ‗Brief review of aggressive xenophobic manifestations on the 
territory of Russian Federation in 2007‘, http://antirasizm.ru/english.php (Last accessed February 2007) 
36
 Fekete, Liz 2000 ‗How the German press stoked the Lubeck fires‘, Race & Class, 41 (4), pp. 19-41; See 
also Bindman, Geoffrey 1997 ‗Murder in Lubeck‘ Race & Class 39 (1), pp. 95-100  
37
 Human Rights First 2008 Violence Based on Racism and Xenophobia: 2008 Hate Crime Survey, Human 
Rights First: Washington DC 
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INTOLERANCE AND XENOPHOBIA IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH 
 
Public opinion surveys of citizen attitudes to migrants and refugees are much less 
common in the Global South. Xenophobic sentiment usually has to be inferred from the 
public statements of officials, the media and attacks on migrants. South Africa was 
rocked in May 2008 by horrific, large-scale attacks on migrants, especially African 
migrants from Southern Africa.
38
  This episode marked the latest development in a long 
series of violent incidents victimizing migrants and refugees in that country.
39
  But it was 
also the expression of deep-seated and pervasive anti-foreign attitudes amongst the 
country‘s citizenry at large.  
  
 In Southern Africa, systematic public opinion surveys have been conducted and 
provide reliable and representative data about citizen attitudes to migrants and refugees. 
In 2001 and 2002, the Southern African Migration Project‘s  (SAMP) National 
Immigration Policy Survey (NIPS) on citizens‘ attitudes toward immigration in Southern 
Africa showed that xenophobia was rampant among diverse groups and communities in 
South Africa, Namibia and Botswana.
40
 Anti-migrant sentiments cut across class, 
employment status, race, and gender lines.  In the Botswana NIPS, more than 20 percent 
of respondents supported policies that would expel all immigrants from the country, 
irrespective of their legal status.
41
 The outcome of questions on citizens‘ willingness to 
participate in action against immigrants from Southern Africa as a whole was even more 
disquieting. Nearly half of those interviewed (47 percent) were ready to participate in 
action to inhibit migrants from settling into their neighbourhoods. Some 46 percent were 
willing to act to thwart them from opening businesses in their localities. More than one 
third of respondents (39 percent) were agreeable to be involved in practices that would 
                                                 
38
 Crush, Jonathan et al 2008 The perfect storm: the realities of xenophobia in contemporary South Africa, 
SAMP Migration Policy Series No. 50, SAMP: Kingston and Cape Town 
39
 Crush, Jonathan 2000 ‗The dark side of democracy: migration, xenophobia and human rights in South 
Africa‘, International Migration, 38 (6), pp. 103-20 
40
 Crush, Jonathan and Wade Pendleton 2004 ‗Regionalizing xenophobia? Citizen attitudes to immigration 
and refugee policy in Southern Africa‘, SAMP Migration Policy Series No. 30, SAMP: Kingston and Cape 
Town 
41
 Campbell, Eugene and John O Oucho 2003 Changing Attitudes to Immigration and Refugee Policy in 
Botswana, Migration Policy Series No. 28, SAMP: Kingston and Cape Town  
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prevent migrants from becoming their co-workers. A similar share (38 percent) was 
willing to prevent children from immigrant families from studying in the same schools as 
their offspring. Botswana was once hailed as a ‗country of immigration‘ for importing, 
for several decades, many skilled immigrants from various countries in Africa, Asia and 
the West.
42
 
 
Even developing countries like Thailand and Tanzania, that had enjoyed a good 
reputation for welcoming migrants and refugees, have recently imposed stringent 
restrictions on their entry and residence or randomly expelled migrants and refugees. In 
2004, the ruling party of Tanzania openly declared: ‗we are tired of refugees.‘43 Even 
some of the poorest countries not generally associated with immigration have displayed 
excessive brutality towards vulnerable migrants and refugees. For example, Angolan 
soldiers raped, tortured, and thrashed irregular Congolese migrants in December 2007 
before deporting them.
44
 Employed in diamond mines, many victims indicated that they 
were subjected to cavity searches and detained for extended periods without food or 
water.
45
  
 
Elsewhere, local residents have violently attacked migrants and refugees on 
several occasions. In December 2005, the Dominican National Committee for Migration 
voiced concern over frequent episodes of xenophobic violence targeting poor Haitian 
migrants.
46
 There have been numerous cases of public lynching of Haitian migrants in the 
past few years in the Dominican Republic. In July and August 2005, locals set fire to 
shacks occupied by Haitian migrants and killed six migrants in the capital Santo 
Domingo.  Migrant-bashing campaigns have also been witnessed in India where a student 
group Chiring Chapori Yuva Manch (CCYM) sent out text messages en masse in the 
                                                 
42
 Morapedi, Wazha 2007 ‗Post-liberation xenophobia in southern Africa: the case of the influx of 
undocumented Zimbabwean immigrants into Botswana, c. 1995-2004‘, Journal of Contemporary African 
Studies, 25 (2), pp. 229-50 
43
 Mckinsey, Kitty 2006 ‗‗Tired of refugees‘: Is African tolerance in decline?‘, Refugees Magazine, 142 (1), 
pp. 23-24  
44
 Simao, Paul 2007 ‗Angolan soldiers rape, beat Congolese migrants – group‘, Reuters Alertnet, 6 
December, http://alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/Lo6594708.htm (Last accessed January 2009) 
45
 Ibid 
46
 Harman, Danna 2006 ‗Haitian migrants face rising backlash next door‘, Christian Science Monitor, 24 
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north-western province of Assam in mid-2005 urging citizens to ‗save nation, save 
identity. Let‘s take an oath – no food, no job, no shelter to [migrant] Bangladeshis‘.47 
Like in Western countries, migrants have been subjected repeatedly to demeaning and 
degrading treatment by citizens of host countries in the South. A Ghanaian migrant living 
in Libya described it in the following words: ‗We are worse than dogs to the Libyans. If 
we were slaves, they would have treated us better‘.48 
 
In this section, we present case studies of five countries in the South that have 
experienced episodes of xenophobic violence as well as acute discrimination against 
migrants, immigrants, and refugees. This is not to suggest that xenophobic violence does 
not occur elsewhere in the South or that it is everywhere this intense. However, this 
report profiles five countries from different parts of the world to illustrate that this is a 
global problem which, in the absence of national and international action, is only likely to 
worsen.   
 
South Africa 
 
 The explosion of xenophobic violence in South Africa‘s poorer urban 
communities in May 2008 led to over 60 deaths (including several by the grotesque 
‗necklacing‘ method of burning people alive), numerous assaults and injuries and 
widespread damage to property owned by foreign nationals.
49
  Tens of thousands fled 
their homes into makeshift ‗refugee‘ encampments.  By the end of 2008, the government 
had closed all of the camps, insisting either that the residents (who included many 
destitute women and children) should either ‗reintegrate‘ or return home.  Many were 
already asylum-seekers or refugees so return home was hardly an option.
50
  The other 
choice offered by government put them at risk of further attacks and appraisals and, 
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indeed, sporadic attacks still continue.
51
  The most recent of these was in January 2009 
when an armed mob led by a community councillor entered a building in Durban and 
began attacking foreign citizens.  Two men, a Tanzainian and a Zimbabwean, jumped  or 
were pushed to their deaths from an upper floor, leading to the arrest for murder of the 
councillor and several mob-members.
52
 
 
 The startled response of many in government and the media to May 2005 
suggested that they were unaware that anti-foreign intolerance and xenophobia had 
become a major challenge to human rights in a democratic South Africa and to the values 
inscribed in the post-apartheid constitution.  As long ago as 1995, however, the Southern 
African Bishops‘ Conference noted that ‗there is no doubt that there is a very high level 
of xenophobia in our country.‘ Their venerable conclusion was supported by successive 
public opinion surveys that demonstrated that South African sentiment towards foreign 
nationals was amongst the most hostile in the world.
53
 Analyses of official 
pronouncements and media coverage of migration issues showed that xenophobia 
extended well beyond isolated individual attitudes.
54
  It was pervasive, deep-rooted and 
structural, cutting across all divides.  If there was one thing that united this diverse 
population, it was their dislike for foreign migrants in the country.   
 
A brief effort by the South African Human Rights Commission to address the issue 
between 1999 and 2002, in the form of a ‗Roll Back Xenophobia‘ campaign, did not 
achieve a great deal before it was wound up.  The campaign held educational workshops 
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for journalists or editors who proved to be extremely hostile to any suggestion that their 
‗facts-based‘ reporting smacked of xenophobia. 
 
 Between 2002 and 2008 attitudes continued to harden. In 2006, for example, 
SAMP found that 37 percent of a nationally representative sample wanted a total ban on 
foreigners entering the country.  Three quarters supported electrification of borders and 
72 percent agreed that non-citizens should carry personal identification with them at all 
times.  Sixty percent supported a policy of deporting any non-citizen with HIV/AIDS.  
Only a minority thought that migrants and refugees should enjoy basic rights such as 
freedom of movement, legal protection, police protection and access to social services.  
As many as 30 percent said they would take action to prevent migrants from 
neighbouring countries moving into or operating a business in their community.  And 16 
percent of those interviewed said they were prepared to combine with others to force 
foreign nationals to leave their area.
55
  And indeed, in the years and months leading up to 
May 2008, violent attacks on foreign nationals became increasingly more common. 
 
Despite the overwhelming research evidence of a powder-keg of xenophobic 
sentiment, the issue was largely ignored in public political discourse, until it was too late.  
Even then, the response of those in government to May 2008 was largely denialist in 
character.  Several prominent politicians initially voiced surprise and concern and 
acknowledged that xenophobia was a significant problem.
56
  They were quickly silenced 
by an official ‗party line‘ from the President‘s office.  The attacks were criminal, not 
xenophobically motivated, said President Mbeki at an official day of mourning for the 
victims.
57
  South Africans were not xenophobic and anyone who said so was themselves 
being xenophobic.  The violence was, to put it mildly, a massive embarrassment for a 
President and government who were active proponents of regional solidarity and Pan-
Africanism and are preparing to host the 2010 Football World Cup.  Better, the President 
must have reasoned, to present the violence as the work of fringe criminal elements rather 
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than in any way representative of South Africa attitudes to foreign migrants and citizens 
in general.  The problem of course was that denialism ignored the overwhelming 
evidence of deep and longstanding xenophobia in the country. 
 
 Explanations for the violence of May 2008 quickly focused on the material 
conditions in affected communities. Many journalists and most academics blamed the 
events on the ANC government‘s poor service delivery record since 1994.58  In these 
accounts, the failures of the government to deal with endemic poverty, joblessness, lack 
of shelter and basic services had led to the scapegoating of foreign migrants by frustrated 
citizens. The government‘s ‗failure‘ to control its borders was seen as another 
precipitating factor by some commentators.
59
 South Africans certainly believe that their 
country is being ‗flooded‘ by millions of irregular migrants from the rest of Africa 
despite evidence to the contrary.
60
  The numbers of foreign migrants in South Africa at 
any one time is certainly a matter of  dispute yet it is  highly unlikely that there are 3-4 
million Zimbabweans in South Africa (as claimed by Mbeki) or 8-10 million 
undocumented migrants (as claimed by Home Affairs officials).   
 
Research (including regular national surveys) shows that xenophobia (expressed 
as hostility to the very presence of non-nationals and attributing to them a range of 
stereotypical negative characteristics) has been widespread in South Africa since at least 
1994.  The media has played a significant role in perpetuating negative stereotypes, as 
has official and popular discourse.  Anti-foreign invective and verbal abuse is 
depressingly common on South African streets.  But most people‘s negative attitudes are 
not the result of first-hand contact with migrants. In 2006 for example, 61 percent of 
South Africans said they had ‗little or no‘ personal contact with migrants from 
neighbouring countries.
61
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While there is an understandable reductionist tendency to view anti-foreign 
violence as a direct product of the material deprivation and competition amongst poor 
South Africans, this does not explain why all poor communities did not explode in May 
2008.  Certainly the violence was stoked by organized groups in affected communities 
and there is evidence of inter-community collaboration.   But the truth is that the violence 
could, and very well may in the future, be much more widespread.  In almost every case, 
attacks were accompanied by the most blunt and bellicose hate speech.  The attacks were 
a brutal example of national ‗ethnic cleansing,‘ of removing foreign citizens from 
territory deemed to ‗belong‘ to citizens only.  In the political  failing to acknowledge the 
reality that xenophobic attitudes are longstanding and pervasive (and had hardened in 
recent years), and by attributing May 2008 to criminal fringe elements, xenophobia was 
regrettably swept under the carpet once again.  A day of ‗Social Dialogue‘ initiated by the 
Home Affairs Minister in September 2008 showed that there were some in government 
who were not happy with this xeno-denialism.  But whether this will lead to the kind of 
state-initiated national effort to roll-back xenophobia in schools, workplaces, 
communities and on the streets remains to be seen.   
 
India 
  
Rising xenophobic antagonism in India has been directed almost exclusively at 
irregular migrants from neighbouring Bangladesh, who are increasingly viewed as a 
threat to national well-being and security. In April 2008, a report by the Parliamentary 
Standing Committee on Home Affairs declared that ‗a large presence of illegal 
Bangladeshi immigrants poses a grave threat to the internal security [of India] and it 
should be viewed strongly.‘62 Citing media reports on Bangladeshi insurgent groups‘ 
involvement in recent terrorist acts in India, the 25-member committee recommended that 
the movement of Bangladeshi migrants into the country should be ‗strictly monitored.‘63 
The conclusion of the committee was not unexpected, especially since it was headed by 
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Sushma Swaraj from the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The BJP and its cohort 
of far right Hindu nationalist parties have, since the early 1990s, vigorously advocated 
the large-scale expulsion of irregular, largely Muslim, migrants from Bangladesh.
64
 Even 
so, the observations of the Parliamentary Standing Committee reflect the general mood in 
India which has become increasingly belligerent and intolerant of the migrants‘ 
presence.
65
  
 
Given their informal and irregular character, there is virtually no accurate or 
reliable data on these migrations. Using Indian Census data on ‗place of birth‘ and ‗place 
of last residence,‘ a recent study estimates that in 2001 there were some 3.1 to 3.7 million 
Bangladeshis in India.
66
 On the other hand, estimates by government agencies, journalists 
and the Hindu right have proffered ever-growing and often staggering numbers. In 2004, 
Union Minister of State for Home Shriprakash Jaiswal informed Rajya Sabha (Upper 
House of the Indian Parliament) that there were more than ‗12 million Bangladeshis‘ 
residing ‗illegally‘ in the country.67 The Indian Border Security Force (BSF) reportedly 
estimates that between 1972 and 2005, some 1.2 million Bangladeshis who entered India 
on tourist visas failed to leave the country.
68
 Even a recent World Bank study contends 
that in terms of flows, the Indo-Bangladesh corridor is one of the most active globally, 
coming a close second to flows across the US-Mexican border.
69
 The highest estimates 
have, however, not surprisingly been presented by Hindu nationalist groups such as the 
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BJP.
70
 In 2003, the BJP and its cohorts claimed that there were some 20 million irregular 
Bangladeshis living in India.
71
           
 
Although the continuing migration of Bangladeshis into India has become a 
highly contentious issue in contemporary times, xenophobic programs occurred in 
previous decades in north-eastern provinces. Because of their proximity to Bangladesh, 
these provinces are believed to have received the largest flows of migrants. In the past as 
well, substantial numbers of refugees moved into these states from the erstwhile East 
Bengal (now Bangladesh) during the partition of the Indian sub-continent (into India and 
East and West Pakistan in 1947) and subsequent formation of an independent nation-state 
of Bangladesh (in 1971).
72
 The long histories of anti-immigrant tendencies in these areas 
have not been systematically researched or documented. Nevertheless, a long-standing 
pattern of hostility towards Bengali speakers has some resonance in the current antipathy 
towards irregular Bangladeshi migrants. There has been a marked tendency to conflate 
earlier groups of Bengali migrants/refugees with newer irregular migrants from 
Bangladesh.
73
 
  
Bhaumik writes about the Bangal Kheda movement (drive away Bengalis) in 
Assam from the late 1940s onwards, provoked by the demographic and cultural changes 
linked to the entry of Bengali-speaking populations from the east.
74
 In the 1960s, many 
Bengali Hindus fled Assam and moved to other provinces like West Bengal and Tripura. 
Anti-Bengali violence was witnessed as well in neighbouring Meghalaya during the 
decades of the 1980s and 1990s. Between 1979-84, the All Assam Students Union 
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(AASU) spearheaded an anti-foreigners‘ movement in Assam opposing the entry of 
irregular Bangladeshis. It also demanded the expulsion of all people of Bengali descent 
who had entered its territories after 1951.
75
 At the height of the movement, close to 2,000 
Bengali-speaking Muslim immigrants were brutally massacred in Nellie.
76
 The violence 
reportedly first broke out over the alleged abduction and rape of Assamese tribal Tiwa 
women by Bengali Muslim migrants.
77
 It also unleashed the simmering resentment 
against the settlement onto tribal lands of Bengali miyas from Mymensingh district of 
East Bengal.  
 
To this day, the strongest expressions of xenophobia against migrant 
Bangladeshis are being witnessed in north-eastern provinces. Scholars like Hazarika have 
argued that in these insurgent-prone, socially and politically unstable areas, the 
continuous entry of substantial numbers of Bangladeshi migrants rapidly aggravates these 
divisive, aggressive tendencies.
78
 Moreover, escalating anxieties about threatened cultural 
or linguistic identities provide a powerful motivating force.
79
 For example, in a news 
interview, Sarbananda Sanowal of the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) party stated: ‗The 
illegal migrants from Bangladesh are a major threat to our identity. We will become 
foreigners in our own land unless we keep these people out of Assam.‘80  
 
Over the last two decades, the exclusionary politics of the Hindu right have only 
re-invigorated the rhetoric of fear and loathing surrounding these migrations. Highly 
incendiary texts associated with the Hindu-right create the specter of an impending 
catastrophe posed by the ‗enemy alien‘ threatening the long-term safety and security of 
the Hindu-Indian nation.
81
 These migrations have been described as a ‗demographic 
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aggression‘ and ‗silent invasion‘ of a ‗Muslim avalanche‘ unleashed on India by ‗millions 
of illiterate, fanatical, hungry and highly motivated Muslims [who] have already settled 
and spread themselves like a swarm of locusts in the lush green fields and forests of 
Assam.‘82 Consistent with the political ideology of the Hindu right, these texts make a 
distinction between Hindu and Muslim migrants from Bangladesh. The former are 
characterized as ‗refugees‘ and as ‗victims‘ of ‗a most iniquitous political system based 
on Islamic fundamentalism‘ while the latter are described as ‗infiltrators‘ who have yet to 
be ‗punished‘ for this ‗ act of crime.‘83 Another propaganda text describes the 
Bangladeshi migrations as the ‗ingredients of a grand design and strategy to demolish 
India…surely, steadily and irreversibly.‘84    
 
This exaggerated imagery has been unquestioningly adopted by many Indians, 
including state authorities. In May 2005, in its judgment repealing the terms of the long-
controversial Illegal Migrants Determination by Tribunals (IMDT) Act, the Supreme 
Court described migration from Bangaldesh as ‗external aggression.‘85 The judgement 
read:  
 
The presence of such large numbers of illegal migrants from Bangladesh, which 
run into millions, is in fact an aggression [emphasis ours] on the state of Assam 
and has also contributed significantly in causing serious internal disturbances in 
the shape of insurgency of alarming proportions.
86
  
 
Even those opposed to the nationalist politics of the Hindu right have supported 
the forcible expulsion of migrant Bangladeshis. Public discourses on migrants now 
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represent them as ‗thieves, traitors and terrorists.‘87 In the past few years, growing 
concerns about Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism have only hardened these 
perceptions. In an op-ed article, for instance, journalist TVR Shenoy argued:   
 
There are as many as 20 million Bangladeshis scattered across India. Some are 
genuine refugees, men and women fleeing persecution. But many are seeking to 
make a quick buck at the Indians‘ expense. More worrying, an increasing number 
are criminals allied to terrorists.
88
 
 
Others have rejected the proposal to issue temporary work permits to the migrants. 
Sanjay Nirupam, then affiliated with the Hindu right-wing Shiv Sena Party, attacked it as 
follows: 
 
With the battalions of the jobless swelling day after day in India, it is absurd to 
roll out the red carpet for Bangladeshis. By admitting them into our own farms 
and factories, the union government will rob our own people of their legitimate 
right to work.‘89  
 
This comment by an ordinary citizen now echoes the sentiments of many living in India: 
‗Too many Bangladeshis are coming here without passports. They take our jobs, some 
are terrorists. They need to be stopped.‘90  
 
In this highly charged scenario, there are increasing reports of violence and 
persecution of Bangladeshi migrants and other minority groups, including Indian 
Muslims and Indian Bengalis. Even migrants from Indian provinces like Bihar and Uttar 
Pradesh have been attacked in places like Assam, Meghalaya and Maharashtra. In 
September 2008, vigilante groups from Assamese indigenous communities conducted a 
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state-wide drive to locate ‗Bangladeshis.‘91 The following month, clashes between the 
indigenous Bodo community and Muslim migrants (including irregular Bangladeshis) in 
northern Assam contributed to more than 50 deaths and the displacement of more than 
10,000 Muslim migrants.
92
 
 
Malaysia 
 
 According to the Department of Immigration, there are 2.1 million documented 
migrant workers in Malaysia.
93
 While the exact numbers are not known, estimates for 
migrants in an irregular situation vary from half a million to five million persons.
94
 Many 
of the registered migrants have arrived from twelve countries in the region including 
ASEAN and neighbouring countries. The largest number of migrant workers is from 
Indonesia followed by Nepal, India, Myanmar, Vietnam, Bangladesh, the Philippines, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka and China, working in the manufacturing, agricultural, construction 
and service sectors.
95
 As one of the most robust economies in South-east Asia, Malaysia 
relies heavily on migrant workers to perform the 3D (dirty, dangerous, and difficult) jobs 
commonly rejected by citizens. Even though their labour is indispensable to the 
Malaysian economy, draconian control measures combined with the absence of cogent 
immigration policies or immigrant quotas mean that migrants often face a raw deal from 
unscrupulous employers, recruitment agencies and enforcement authorities.
96
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There are some 100,000 refugees, asylum-seekers and stateless persons in the 
country. By August 2008, the UNHCR had registered 41,405 asylum-seekers, nearly 90 
percent from Myanmar. Since Malaysia has not formally accepted international human 
rights instruments for the protection of refugees, like the 1951 Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, many 
refugees (even those registered by the UNHCR) are routinely treated as irregular 
migrants by immigration authorities and RELA, the People‘s Volunteer Corps, or Itakan 
Relawan Rakyat, used to control irregular migration. In a crackdown on irregular 
migrants in 2005, then Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Najib Razak confirmed this 
conflation: ‗We will take action against anyone who is here illegally. There is no 
exemption on this including those carrying letters, genuine or otherwise from the 
UNHCR. If the UNHCR wishes to appeal after these people are arrested, it is up to them. 
But it is up to us whether we accept the appeal or not.‘97 A 2003 Human Rights Watch 
study censured the Malaysian government for not recognizing as refugees Indonesians 
who had fled military operations and martial law in the war-torn Aceh province.
98
  
 
Like many other destination countries, Malaysia has not ratified the International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Families. In 
recent times, it has taken several steps that contravene the human rights of both 
documented and irregular migrants. In February 2007, for example, Malaysia proposed 
that migrant workers be confined to their kongsi (work areas) even when they are not 
working and that their travel in the country be carefully monitored by authorities.
99
 Some 
of the harshest measures of the Malaysian state have been directed at irregular migrants 
who are increasingly unwelcome.
100
 Apprehended irregular migrants have been subjected 
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to corporal punishment like whipping and caning.
101
 They have also been detained for 
extended periods in camps that fail to meet minimum standards recommended by the 
United Nations.
102
 In August 2002, the Philippines‘ government summoned the 
Malaysian Ambassador Mohamad Taufik to hand over a formal complaint protesting the 
mistreatment of irregular Filipina migrants.
103
 The Philippines Foreign Secretary Blas 
Ople explained at a news conference that although the country did not expect ‗Hilton-
standard treatment‘ for its citizens in Malaysia, several reports had indicated that the 
conditions in the detention centers were ‗unduly harsh.‘  
 
Poor treatment is sometimes justified by making migrants scapegoats for 
‗problems‘ like crime. RELA‘s Director-General Zaidon Asmuni declared in a recent 
newspaper interview: ‗We have no more Communists at the moment, but we are now 
facing illegal immigrants. As you know, illegal immigrants are enemy No. 2 in Malaysia 
[following drugs as Enemy no. 1].‘104 Similarly, a RELA volunteer expressed a common 
sentiment about migrants: ‗Especially the illegal immigrants from Indonesia, they always 
give us a lot of trouble. They break into the house, they rob…steal everything. Most 
Malaysians worry about it.‘105  
 
Crackdown operations against irregular migrants have been carried out on a 
regular basis. In 2005, the government launched ‗Operation Tegas‘ (meaning tough or 
firm operation) to control the number of irregular migrants.
106
 The Daily Express 
newspaper quoted Sabah MP Wilfred Madius Tangau who urged ordinary Malaysians to 
report the whereabouts of irregular migrants: ‗As we celebrate the coming Malaysia Day 
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on September 16, we must stand united in support of the government‘s efforts in ridding 
the state of illegal immigrants.‘107 Operation Tegas was renewed in December 2008 
under conditions of global economic slowdown.
108
 During the operation in 2005, 
thousands of Acehnese asylum-seekers were detained, many of them sentenced to jail or 
whipping. 
109
 On 28 February 2005, the Indonesian Labour and Transmigration Minister 
Fahmi Idris revealed that some 100,000 Indonesian irregular migrants who had not been 
paid by their employers were refusing to go back despite the constant threat of forcible 
detention and expulsion.
110
  
 
On March 17, 2007 at its Annual General Meeting, the Malaysian Bar  Council 
(Badan Peguam Malaysia) unanimously urged the government to use trained law 
enforcement personnel and disband RELA.
111
 Set up originally in 1972 ‗to help maintain 
security in the country and the well-being of the people‘ in an attempt to restrain the 
spread of communism, the 2005 amendment to Malaysia‘s Essential Regulations Act 
gave RELA workers extensive authority to enter or carry out searches of public and 
private spaces without an arrest warrant, make arrests, provided the right to carry and use 
firearms and to check the citizenship documents of anyone living in the country.
112
 With 
nearly half a million volunteers, RELA‘s numerical strength exceeds the total number of 
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Malaysian police and military personnel.
113
 Largely untrained, the volunteers receive an 
allowance for their work and until mid-2007 received a special bonus based on the 
number of migrants apprehended.
114
  
 
Advocacy and migrant groups have heavily criticized the actions of RELA 
workers who are accused of frequently abusing the extraordinary powers accorded to 
them. RELA volunteers have come under attack for their treatment of migrants, for 
confiscating personal property during raids (including clothing, jewellery and household 
goods), for demanding bribes from detainees, and for deliberately destroying valid 
identification documents. In 2007, Human Rights Watch described RELA as ‗little more 
than a vigilante force to target foreigners‘ arguing that ‗the Malaysian government fans 
xenophobia through its use of RELA.‘115 RELA members have also on occasion failed to 
respect the rights of refugees and asylum seekers. In one episode in January 2007, 45 
men and 7 women asylum-seekers from Myanmar‘s Chin state were arrested and sent to 
Lenggeng Detention Camp.
116
  
 
On February 12 and 13, 2006, following an immigration raid conducted by RELA 
in the Selayang area of the capital city Kuala Lumpur, bodies of five migrant workers 
were discovered in a lake.
117
 Allegedly, they were victims of the excessive brutality 
exhibited by someRELA workers. The following month, the Special Rapporteur on the 
Human Rights of Migrants and the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or 
Arbitrary Executions expressed their concern to the Malaysian government over the 
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incident.
118
 The Malaysian government, however, did not offer an explanation. The same 
year, an appeal by Jorge Bustamante, the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of 
Migrants, to visit the country to assess the condition of migrants and refugees was also 
ignored.
119
 In December 2008, despite accepting the allegations of maltreatment by some 
volunteers, the Malaysian government unequivocally rejected any plans to dissolve 
RELA emphasizing that ‗RELA has served the country well and has a useful purpose.‘120  
 
Thailand 
 
Thailand is one of the major migration destination countries in South-East Asia. 
In 2007, there were more than 300,000 highly and semi-skilled migrant workers from 
Western and East Asian countries in Thailand.
121
 Additionally, there were around 
650,000 registered low-skilled migrant workers in Thailand from the Greater Mekong 
Region, including countries like Myanmar, Lao PDR and Cambodia. Another 1.3 million 
migrants from these countries are believed to exist irregularly here. The largest number of 
migrants are from Myanmar, believed to account for some 70-80 percent of migrant 
workers. Over the past several decades, Thailand has also hosted a large number of 
refugees, totalling several million by some accounts. It continues to host several hundred 
thousand refugees to this date, albeit reluctantly.   
 
Several categories of migrants have faced acute discrimination in this country, 
living and working in inferior, exploitative conditions. These include refugees and 
asylum-seekers, migrant workers in low skilled positions, and irregular migrants.  More 
than ever, unskilled migrant workers from the Greater Mekong Region are vulnerable to 
abuse and exploitation. Because of their status, irregular migrants exist at the fringes of 
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Thai society without social and legal protection. In addition, refugees and asylum-seekers 
have been at risk, often treated as irregular migrants. Migrants can sometimes straddle 
several of these categories at the same time which also has a bearing on their 
vulnerability in this receiving state. 
 
In 2008, a report by the United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 
(USCRI) ranked Thailand as one of the ten worst host countries worldwide for 
refugees.
122
 Since early last year, Thai authorities have refused to accept as refugees 
hundreds of Rohingya Muslims from Myanmar, many of whom are believed to have 
drowned in the Andaman Sea while trying to reach Thailand.
123
 In an attempt to stem 
additional flows, the Thai government threatened to detain them on a deserted island. At 
the end of the year, it attracted widespread criticism for allowing its army to forcibly turn 
back out hundreds of Rohingya refugees to sea, resulting in a large number of deaths.
124
 
An independent human rights monitoring group, Arakan Project, revealed that several 
groups of refugees were coerced by the Thai army into small boats with their hands 
bound and set adrift with little food and water. The refugees drifted for more than two 
weeks in the Andaman Sea before they were rescued by the Indian coastguard. It is 
believed that nearly 500 refugees may have perished during the journey.
125
 Although the 
Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva initially denied any wrongdoing, eye-witness accounts 
and photographs taken by tourists soon forced the Thai government to initiate an inquiry 
into these human rights abuses.
126
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Though not a party to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees or 
its 1967 Protocol, Thailand has played host to large numbers of refugees from 
neighbouring countries, especially Myanmar, for several decades. All the same, from the 
late 1990s onwards, it has adopted a progressively hardnosed approach towards refugees. 
In particular, after dissidents seized the Myanmar embassy in Bangkok and occupied the 
Ratchaburi hospital in October 1999, Thai authorities moved all Burmese asylum-seekers 
to camps close to the Thailand-Myanmar border and narrowed the criteria of 
acceptance.
127
 The official stance hardened even further after Burmese refugees protested 
outside the Myanmar embassy and The United Nations building in Bangkok in June 
2003, when it threatened to expel them en masse from its territories. In 2005, it 
announced that Burmese refugees living in urban areas would be moved to camps near 
the border. In 2004, under extraordinary pressure from the Thai government, UNHCR 
had to suspend the screening of asylum-seekers under the Refugee Determination System 
(RDS).
128
  
 
Refugee groups have criticized Thailand for failing to respect the human rights of 
refugees, many of whom are ‗warehoused‘ and face severe restrictions on settlement 
outside camps.
129
 This situation has been particularly serious for Burmese refugees, some 
of whom have been ‗warehoused‘ for more than 20 years.130 Refugees are forced to 
depend on humanitarian aid or seek work illegally outside the camps. It is believed that 
up to 40 percent of refugees find such employment in order to survive, facing the risk of 
being detained and deported as irregular migrants.
131
 In areas like Mae Hong Song, 
refugees are employed in low wage sectors like agriculture but are forced to bribe police 
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regularly to evade arrest and detention for defying the rules. Refugees from the Greater 
Mekong Region are allowed to register to work as migrant labour in selected, low-waged 
sectors of the Thai economy. However, they lose their status as refugees and their names 
are disclosed to their home governments which discourages many from registering in this 
program.  
 
Forced detention and deportation of refugees have become increasingly 
commonplace. According to the World Refugee Survey 2008, the Thai Ministry of 
Interior lists on its website as one of its priority tasks: ‗to intercept and drive back 
refugees.‘132 Over the last two years, the Thai government repatriated several hundred 
Hmong asylum-seekers and refugees from Laos. In early 2007, it deported 16 Hmong 
asylum-seekers from Laos before UNHCR could assess their cases. Reportedly, the 
deportees were immediately incarcerated by Lao authorities upon their return. A few days 
later, another 150 Hmong asylum-seekers were forcibly returned to Laos even though 
UNHCR had recognized them as refugees. In June 2007, two Lao Hmong refugees who 
reportedly attempted to kill themselves in fear of repatriation revealed that Thai 
authorities brutally coerced them into giving consent for repatriation. In 2008, Thai 
authorities declared their intention to repatriate 7,800 Hmong refugees living in a closed 
camp in Petchabun province, ‗no matter how many bullet wounds they have.‘133 
 
Like Thai policy on refugees, policies towards migrant workers have widened the 
gap between migrants and citizens. For example, a ‗Provincial Decree on Migrant 
Workers‘ adopted by the government of Phuket in December 2006 has severely inhibited 
the movement and basic rights of migrant workers from Myanmar, Cambodia and 
Laos.
134
 They are no longer permitted to own cell phones, drive motor bikes or cars or to 
leave their residences between 8 pm and 6 am. Since mid-2007, the decree has been 
adopted by seven other Thai provinces on grounds of ‗national security.‘ Similarly, the 
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Thai government adopted another controversial law in March 2008 which rewards 
informers in apprehending irregular migrants.
135
 Migrant advocacy groups have urged the 
authorities to repeal this law, arguing that it ‗will create more divisions between migrants 
and Thai communities and [inflame] xenophobia.‘136  
 
Advocacy groups like the Migrant Working Group and Labour Rights Promotion 
Network have also censured Thai authorities for inflaming xenophobic sentiments 
through public statements that vilify migrants. In November 2007, they expressed their 
dismay over the ‗cultural insensitivities and prejudice against foreign workers‘ exhibited 
by Veerayuth Yeamampur, then governor of Samut Sakhon province in an official 
letter.
137
 The communiqué issued to employers of factories in the province described 
migrant workers from the Greater Mekong Region as ‗problems,‘ causing ‗criminal 
problems‘ and ‗security problems‘:   
 
They [migrant workers from Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos] are also now trying 
to organize cultural performances at social occasions and fairs, which is not 
suitable. These activities are not be supported because it will make the community 
feel that these people are the owners of the community and it could also create 
security problems…We should not allow them to organize cultural ceremonies at 
all.
138
  
 
Official policy resonates with Thai opinions on migrant workers. Citizens‘ 
attitudes have generally been unfavourable towards Burmese migrants and refugees.
139
 
An ABAC public opinion survey sponsored by the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) and United Nations Fund for Women (UNIFEM) on attitudes towards migrant 
workers carried out in 2006 showed that nearly 59 percent of respondents wanted the 
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government to ban the entry of migrant labour.
 140
 Only nine percent of respondents were 
supportive of the entry of additional migrant workers. More than 80 percent of 
participants believed that migrant labour had an adverse impact on the wages of Thai 
workers, in particular those with lower skills and wages. While many participants 
indicated that they would report the abuse of migrant workers, they did not favour equal 
rights and opportunities for them. Forty percent of the participants were opposed to 
migrants‘ receiving the same wages as Thai citizens. Similarly, half of the respondents 
felt that migrant workers should not receive the same Social Security benefits.  
 
Although migrant workers from Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos added an 
estimated $2 billion to the country‘s total GDP of USD$177 billion in 2005, a majority of 
respondents believed that they did not contribute positively to the Thai economy.
141
 More 
than 70 percent of the participants accepted that migrants were ‗hard-working,‘ though 
only 20 percent considered them to be ‗honest‘ and ‗loyal.‘ Respondents also lacked 
adequate knowledge about Thai policies towards migrant workers, with only three of the 
eight policies being familiar to half of the participants. Significantly, a majority of 
respondents indicated that they were influenced by negative media reporting on migrant 
workers.  
 
Libya 
 
The most explosive bout of anti-immigrant aggression witnessed in Libya to date 
erupted in Zawiya (also spelled as Zawiyya, Ezzaouia and Az zawiya), west of Tripoli, in 
September 2000. Although government officials played down the incident and reported 
only seven casualties, international media coverage revealed that the numbers of those 
killed were much higher. According to the World Refugee Survey (2001), several 
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hundred migrants were killed and some 20,000 African migrants fled Libya.
142
 Other 
estimates indicate that 50 or so migrants died due to the violence.
143
 The chain of events 
that sparked the violence is still unclear. To date, the Libyan government has not 
disclosed details of the terrible episode even though it claims to have conducted an 
investigation into it.
144
 According to the Sudanese independent daily newspaper Akhbar 
al-Yom, some 50 people were killed in clashes between Libyans and migrants from Sudan 
and Chad.
145
 Similarly, BBC News reported that a trivial dispute ostensibly triggered the 
clashes between Libyans and migrants from Chad and Sudan, subsequently spreading to 
Tripoli.
146
 Another BBC news article indicated that a petty fight among onlookers at a 
football match provided the initial spark.
147
 A senior Libyan official informed Human 
Rights Watch in 2000 that the first clash took place between Libyans and Nigerian 
migrants over the latter allegedly ‗teasing girls.‘148 He emphasized that ‗the police 
intervened immediately and took the necessary measures and arrested those who were 
involved.‘149   
 
The cause of the initial clash may have been insignificant, but the violence was 
widespread and clearly directed at immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa. One article 
reported that large gangs of Libyans chanting ‗blacks must go‘ went on a rampage in a 
migrant neighbourhood, killing some 50 Sudanese and Chad workers.
150
 The violence 
then quickly spread to other areas like Zahrah and Benghazi. On September 25, a mob of 
around 1,000 Libyans reportedly attacked and set ablaze a locality occupied by Ghanaian 
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migrants.
151
 A repatriated Nigerian migrant later stated that ‗the only way to describe 
Libya [was] hellfire.‘ Other narratives argue that much of the violence was directed at 
Nigerian immigrants who were accused by officials of engaging in criminal activities and 
inciting the clashes.
152
  
 
Libya‘s leader Muammar Gaddafi blamed the attacks on foreign ‗hidden hostile 
hands‘ seeking to undermine his vision of African unity.153 Eyewitness accounts, 
however, point out that gangs of youth carried out the rampage with the direct and 
indirect complicity of state authorities. News of sporadic attacks on migrants persisted 
even three months after the first bout of violence.
154
 Migrants from countries like Chad, 
Sudan, Gambia, Ghana, Congo and Nigeria complained that they were viciously attacked 
and their host and home governments had failed to protect them.
155
 Repatriated migrants 
from countries like Nigeria described the racist conduct meted out to them by locals, 
declaring that Libyans ‗disliked blacks.‘ They said that they were called derogatory 
names like ‗monkey‘ in the streets and even Libyan children often covered their noses in 
their presence.
156
 A returned Ghanaian migrant noted: ‗It was not easy, because being a 
black man (in Libya), you can‘t live there simply. You can‘t move around freely. The 
problem is: Libyans don‘t like blacks.‘157  
 
In a report to the UN Commission on Human Rights in 2001, Maurice Glele-
Ahanhanzo, then Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance condemned this xenophobic 
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aggression as ‗witch hunts targeting blacks.‘158 He cited an article that appeared on 22 
November 2000 in the Ivorian daily newspaper Fraternite Matin:  
 
Immigrants said that they were victims of racist attacks resulting in deaths, 
expulsions, and repatriations for the luckiest…immigrants from sub-Saharan 
Africa and especially nationals of Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ghana, Niger, 
Nigeria, Sudan, Chad and even Côte d‘Ivoire , were treated by locals and 
especially by young rebels in a way reminiscent of apartheid [emphasis in 
original]. The authorities, who attribute this violence to clashes between gangs 
from black Africa, expelled several thousand back to their countries of origin.
159
   
 
Another report in the Jeune Afrique newspaper described the event as a ‗pogrom‘: 
 
It was difficult for the Libyan authorities to maintain for very long their rather 
anodyne version of the dramatic events that had taken place at Ezzaouia at the end 
of September. Six people died (one of whom was a Libyan). This official figure 
was very quickly refuted by survivors of the pogrom who managed to leave 
Jamahiriya [Libya]. In point of fact, several hundred African immigrant workers 
were killed…the tidal wave of immigrants seeking refuge in embassy compounds 
and the complaints of NGOs eventually revealed the seriousness of the situation. 
Abuja then chartered a plane which, in the course of seven trips, evacuated 450 
Nigerian nationals. Almost 5000 are waiting to leave the former Libyan El 
Dorado. John Jerry Rawlings, the President for Ghana, went to Tripoli to recover 
his nationals. Sudanese and Chadians are also leaving the Jamahiriya in droves. 
The two million Africans residing legally in Libya are completely terrified.
 160
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During the repatriation of Nigerian migrants in the aftermath of the violence, the 
Libyan embassy Charge D’Affaires in Abuja was quoted in the Nigerian Post Express 
newspaper as saying that the repatriations were ‗good riddance to bad rubbish.‘161 He 
underscored that migrants residing illegally would be ‗fished out,‘ and blamed Nigerian 
migrants for the mounting levels of crime: ‗Some of them who can‘t get a job get 
involved in drug peddling, prostitution and armed robbery, which our society does not 
like.‘ Partly seeking to assuage popular sentiments, many African migrants whom the 
authorities blamed for the clashes were quickly expelled by the state.
162
 Significantly, the 
clashes erupted shortly after the General People‘s Congress (Parliament) announced their 
plans to tighten immigration by apprehending and deporting migrants without papers. 
Many of the migrants had existed in Libya for an extended period without proper 
documentation and their presence had been tolerated by local authorities.  
 
Since it is conducted largely through informal and irregular channels, accurate 
figures for migrants may be hard to calculate.  The Libyan government puts the number 
of legal migrants at around 600,000 and of irregular migrants between 750,000 and 1.2 
million.
163
 Other assessments provide much higher figures of 2 to 2.5 million migrants, 
including some one to one and a half million migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa.
164
 
Reportedly, there are a substantial number of migrants from countries like Chad and 
Sudan. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that there are 
currently some two million migrants in Libya consisting of slightly more than thirty 
percent of the country‘s population of 6 million.165 In the last few years, Libya has 
become a stopover point for African migrants headed to Western Europe.   
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It is also important to note that Libya had pursued an open-door policy towards 
migrants for several decades. During the 1970s and 1980s, the economic boom that 
followed the discovery of oil attracted many migrants from neighbouring countries like 
Sudan.
166
 In the 1990s, when the air and arms embargo imposed on Libya by the UN 
Security Council isolated the country more than ever from the West, Gaddafi opened 
Libya to the rest of Africa.
167
 Frustrated by the so-called uncooperativeness of Arab 
states, and in a radical shift in foreign policy, he recast himself as an African leader 
inviting Sub-Saharan Africans to seek employment in the country in the spirit of Pan-
African solidarity. Previously the destination point for mostly North African migrants, a 
major surge took place in trans-Saharan migration to Libya. The country became a major 
destination country with some one million migrants entering its borders during that 
decade. Migrants filled up positions in the informal and labour-intensive construction 
sectors doing menial jobs that citizens did not want to perform. 
 
The welcome mat extended to African migrants was already wearing thin by the 
mid-1990s when the Libyan economy had shrunk, partly due to sanctions, and inflation 
levels were extraordinarily high. Unemployment rates for citizens reached as high as 30 
percent.
168
 As migrant numbers continued to climb upwards, the Libyan government 
announced its plans to cut down on foreign labour and tackle irregular migration. In 
1995, 335,000 migrants left Libya.
169
 Of these, 200,000 were deported after being 
apprehended in intensive raids called kasha while others left voluntarily after being given 
a one-week grace period to quit the country.
170
 The Libyan state‘s unease over the alleged 
entry of fundamentalist Islamic groups abetted by Sudan further provoked these 
widespread raids. In 1996, however, the Libyan authorities were forced to relax these 
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expulsions after receiving widespread criticism following an incident in which several 
hundred Sudanese migrants were killed. Apparently, the fatalities occurred after 4,000 
Sudanese migrants imprisoned in Hawza Elenab fled the detention centre and began 
protesting outside the Sudanese embassy.   
 
Since 2003, when sanctions against Libya were lifted, the country has faced 
mounting pressure from the EU to curb irregular migration to Western European 
countries. In particular, demands from Italy have had an added effect on state policies, 
and especially towards irregular migrants. Not surprisingly, the official stance in Libya 
now is that irregular migrants contribute to ‗problems‘ that have ‗an impact on the 
economic, sanitary, social and security situation.‘171 In 2006 at a meeting for an EU-
African migration and development conference, Gaddafi informed participants: ‗I support 
your efforts to stop illegal immigration and I wish that migration stops because Libya is 
one of the countries paying dearly for it.‘172      
 
Public attitudes towards migrants have not been systematically recorded through 
large-scale surveys in Libya. Press coverage on immigration has not yet been examined 
critically. Nevertheless, the few studies available make it clear that xenophobic attitudes 
and practices are rampant. Immigrants, especially those from other African countries, are 
commonly treated with contempt and derision. A Human Rights Watch report has 
highlighted the widespread antagonism and hostility, including physical and verbal 
attacks, harassment, and extortion, encountered by migrants in Libya.
173
 Cultural, 
religious, and racial differences between migrants and citizens have contributed to some 
extent to the growth of this animosity.  
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CAUSES OF XENOPHOBIA 
 
This section provides a brief review of various theories commonly advanced to explain 
xenophobia.  Most of these explanations were developed to try and explain the 
phenomenon in migrant destination countries of the North. However, where possible, this 
paper makes reference to the applicability of such theories to the rise of xenophobia in 
the global South.  
 
The socio-biological approach to xenophobia proposes that human beings are 
biologically predisposed to favouring their own and discriminating against outsiders. It 
uses the analogy of infants shying away from strangers to argue that xenophobia is an 
innate behaviour and central to the human make-up.
174
 Accordingly, conditions of 
economic and emotional insecurity simply exacerbate these ‗natural‘ tendencies. In other 
words, violence against outsiders is a spontaneous, inevitable aspect of the human 
condition. Following this approach, negative outcomes can be expected from increasing 
levels of immigration.  
 
However, not all immigration-countries have experienced similar xenophobic 
reactions and some countries that have received very few immigrants have also registered 
very high levels of xenophobia. Some scholars have justifiably criticized this approach 
for providing validation to an anti-immigration stance.
175
 It is worrying that this approach 
can be used to justify the marginalization, exploitation, and expulsion of migrant groups. 
In 2000, for example, during a public debate on rising levels of xenophobia in Slovenia, a 
journalist defended it as a ‗normal, understandable‘ response when he observed: ‗If 
foreigners don‘t leave…the local people will try to starve them out which is of course 
scandalous but understandable [emphasis ours].‘176        
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What happens when different groups of people come in contact with each other? 
Is the outcome of this contact inevitably tension and conflict between the groups as 
proposed by the socio-biology approach? Or does contact lead to tolerance? In this 
context, does social contact between migrant and non-migrant groups produce positive or 
negative results? Gordon Allport‘s original approach held that certain types of contact 
can diminish prejudice, though the reverse could also hold true.
 177
 He outlined four broad 
conditions under which contact between groups would result in greater harmony and 
understanding between them. First, the groups in question should have or perceive equal 
status. Second, the contact should be effective in that the groups must work together, 
relying on each other to achieve a common goal. Third, he emphasized the need for inter-
group cooperation rather than competition. Fourth, he suggested that inter-group contact 
will be more effective if it is supported by authorities and the guidelines that shape these 
interactions are clearly provided.  
 
There has been considerable scholarly debate on the nature of contact as well as 
the facilitating conditions outlined by Allport.
178
 Although some scholars contend that 
contact almost always leads to discord and disagreement, others have suggested that it 
can actually diminish discriminatory behaviour, contributing to greater tolerance and 
understanding between diverse groups.
179
 One of the strongest proponents of the latter 
approach is Pettigrew who has long maintained that contact leads to friendliness between 
groups. In fact, he proposes that even when the conditions outlined by Allport are not 
met, contact can correct existing biases and increase empathy towards out-groups.
 180
 
 
Legge‘s study of Germany concludes that the marked variations in contact with 
foreigners between the eastern and western parts of the country contributed to the uneven 
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growth of xenophobia.
181
 Residents of former West Germany, who were three times more 
likely to come into contact with migrants at work or in their neighbourhood, displayed 
much more favourable feelings towards them. Mclaren‘s analysis of Eurobarometer data 
deduces that contact can have a constructive effect on native attitudes especially in 
relation to perceived realistic and symbolic threat (examined later in this paper).
182
 She 
argues that in contexts where large numbers of immigrants exist, friendship between 
native and migrant populations can substantially ease the level of perceived threat.    
 
More recently, Pettigrew and Tropp‘s meta-analysis draws parallel inferences. 
Ninety-five percent of their sample reported that lower inter-group prejudice 
corresponded with increased contact even though only ten percent of the sample 
examined friendship and a limited nineteen percent of the sample followed Allport‘s 
guiding conditions.
183
 Notably, contact between different racial and ethnic groups showed 
some of the strongest effects; this has strong resonance for migration researchers and 
policy-makers. Like Mclaren, they deduced that reducing anxiety during contact would 
have a marked impact on prejudice, reducing it by one-fifth or even one-quarter in some 
cases.  
  
In Allport‘s ther concept of ‗scapegoating,‘ people displace their frustration onto 
convenient targets, thereby obscuring the actual causes of their anxiety.
184
 The scapegoats 
are invariably weaker, vulnerable, minority groups and the process operates on an 
individual level. In the context of xenophobia, immigrants, migrants and refugees are 
made convenient scapegoats, unfairly and erroneously blamed for various problems such 
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as housing, unemployment and crime.
185
 As non-citizens who may already be 
marginalized because of their status, migrants make easy scapegoats and victims. The 
process operates not only on an individual level; it is a social process and the media, 
political parties, and state all contribute to it, influencing each other and society at 
large.
186
  
 
In focus group interviews on asylum-related issues conducted by the London-
based Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR), a majority of British participants 
exhibited hostility to asylum-seekers.
187
 Participants held them responsible for housing 
shortages and felt that they were preferentially provided accommodation by local 
authorities. They also blamed asylum-seekers for unemployment, not realizing that the 
latter are not allowed to work. When informed of this, many participants declared that 
asylum-seekers were unwilling to work and thereby not contributing to the economy.  
 
 Another common social issue for which migrants are made scapegoats is crime. In 
many host countries, there is an enduring belief that migrants are responsible for 
increasing levels of crime. In a study of Greek police attitudes towards migrant groups, 
they were described as a ‗huge problem.‘ 188 In the words of a study participant: 
 
Migration has harmed Greece to a very great extent. Migrants have made us 
fearful of sleeping in our yards and balconies in the summer, as we used to before. 
Everyone lives in fear now. Greece has become a fenceless vineyard in which 
anyone can enter whenever they want and the results are evident. They made us 
install alarms in our houses and sleep with a gun under the pillow. I do not think 
migrants are a good thing for Greece.
189
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However, these perceptions are often divorced from reality. In the United States, 
for example, data from the 2000 Census Survey demonstrated that the incarceration rate 
of US-born was four times higher (3.51 percent) than that for foreign-born residents (0.86 
percent).
190
 The foreign-born rate (0.57 percent) was half that of non-Hispanic white 
citizens (1.71 percent) and 13 times less than the rate for native black men (11.61 
percent). Despite lower levels of education, the incarceration rates for migrant groups like 
Mexicans (0.70 percent), Guatemalans and Salvadoran immigrants (0.52 percent) were 
low. Interestingly, many of these groups are often vilified as ‗illegals‘ and blamed for 
rising criminal activity. Scapegoating tendencies and public rhetoric of fear and loathing 
collectively shape and define the contours of symbolic threat posed by immigrants. That 
is, they transform diverse migrant groups in the public imagination as an undifferentiated 
mass, representing a ‗menace‘ and ‗threat‘ to the well-being and security of host 
populations.   
 
When migrants are made scapegoats for social ills, negative and biased 
stereotypes are produced, re-produced and accepted as ‗common sense.‘ This rhetoric not 
only instigates fear and loathing by demonizing migrants as the ‗Other,‘ it also excuses 
the poor treatment of migrants.
191
 It creates divisions between citizens and migrant 
groups as ‗Us‘ and ‗Them.‘ Here, the latter are attributed qualities that are negative and 
which dehumanize, debase, and degrade them. They are viewed as somehow inferior and 
not worthy of equal or fair treatment. Differences between migrant and native 
populations are exaggerated while similarities are overlooked, maintaining social distance 
between migrants and native groups.   
 
Exclusionary, divisive, and dynamic rhetoric is created, shaped, and sustained by 
the media, mainstream politicians, extreme right-wing parties, and even citizens. 
Sometimes also characterized as ‗discriminatory discourses,‘ the rhetoric of fear and 
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loathing generally contains some constant features.
192
 However, discriminatory 
discourses do respond to changing contexts, mutating in form and substance, which adds 
to their potency and effectiveness. Established discourses on migrants as ‗criminals,‘ 
‗carriers of disease,‘ and ‗job-stealers‘ now combine with newer ideas about ‗threats‘ to 
‗national identity‘ and ‗national security.‘193 Hagendoorn and Sniderman‘s survey of 
prejudice in the Netherlands, for example, showed that in terms of perceived threat, the 
danger posed by immigrants to cultural identity far outweighed other concerns for 
participants, such as threat to economic well-being and safety.
194
  
 
The term ‗asylum-seeker‘ has been transformed in recent years from a legal term 
referring to those seeking a safe haven to becoming synonymous with ‗illegal migrants‘ 
or ‗bogus‘ refugees.195 While campaigning for local elections in West Yorkshire in 2004, 
Nick Griffin, chairman of the far-right British National Party and one of his deputies, 
Mark Collett, described asylum-seekers in a demeaning way as ‗cockroaches.‘ ‗I often 
say asylum-seekers are like cockroaches, because it‘s take, take, take,‘ stated the latter, 
urging people to vote for his party ‗if [they] want these people out and stop the asylum-
seekers coming in.‘196 In South Africa and Botswana, immigrants, migrant labourers, and 
refugees are denigrated as ‗kwerekwere‘ and ‗amakwerekwere‘ or people who speak with 
strange accents.
197
 The term also carries other pejorative references, such the ‗darkest of 
the dark-skinned,‘ people from (culturally and economically) backward countries, and 
‗primitives,‘ ‗savages‘ or ‗barbarians.‘198   
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 Grillo‘s account of opposition to proposed housing for asylum-seekers at a hotel 
in Saltdean, a well-to-do middle-class suburb in the seaside resort of Brighton and Hove, 
England, shows how popular exclusionary discourses on immigration at a national level 
can manifest themselves at the local scale.
199
 More importantly, the study reveals the 
manner in which the national ‗moral panic‘ concerning refugees shaped and was 
subsequently reproduced by this smaller community who protested that they would be 
‗swamped by many more [asylum-seekers], with the school and health services overrun‘ 
and ‗crime rates will rocket,‘ ‗our streets will become unsafe for women, children and 
older members of our community‘ and ‗they will steal washing off the lines.‘200 Arguing 
that they were ‗law-abiding, tax-paying residents appalled at the influx of people from 
another land and culture,‘ residents sought to justify their resistance to the hostel on the 
grounds that they were not opposed to ‗genuine asylum-seekers but against those who 
don‘t have a right to be here that the Government are letting in.‘201   
 
Material produced by the Saltdean Residents‘ Action Group (SRAG) contended 
that their ancestors did not fight the last war ‗so this country could be turned into a 
foreign land and overrun with every Tom, Dick and Harry that cares to drop in 
uninvited.‘202 During public protests, residents held banners and placards that expressed 
sentiments familiar in many British mainstream and tabloid newspapers: ‗Homes for our 
elderly, not bogus asylum-seekers [emphasis ours].‘203 Although the SRAG sought to 
distance itself from the British National Party (BNP) which participated in these protests, 
many of its arguments ironically intersected with those of the party. 
 
Xenophobia has also been tied to the exclusionary impulse of nation-building 
processes and nationalism. Immigration and the presence of immigrants may simply 
exaggerate this impulse, argue some scholars. In her work on immigration and national 
identity in Europe, Triandafyllidou observes that the continued entry of political refugees 
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and economic migrants has posed a fundamental challenge to European nation-states.
204
 
Receiving states have to manage the increasing cultural and ethnic diversity produced by 
immigration. They are also confronted with the task of dealing with the immigrant 
‗Other‘ who challenges the cultural identity of the nation-state. Similarly in South Africa, 
the rise of xenophobia after 1994 has been attributed to the redefinition of ‗insiders‘ and 
‗outsiders‘ that accompanied the post-apartheid nation-building project.205    
 
A related perspective links the growth of xenophobic sentiments to the 
development of aggressive forms of nationalism, in which the tendencies to eliminate or 
prohibit are much more strongly evident. In particular, the new Right has espoused 
notions of ethno-nationalism which include only people belonging to their own 
nationality, excluding immigrants and other ethnic minorities.
206
 This form of nationalism 
constructs the idealized notion of a geographical area being occupied by people from 
certain races or ethnicities. Here, the restrictive notion of national community is formed 
through birth and descent.    
 
A noteworthy development tied to the resurgence of xenophobia, witnessed 
especially in Western European countries over the past two or so decades, is the growth 
of extreme right-wing political formations. Sometimes described as Radical Right-Wing 
Populist Parties (RRP Parties) or the New Right, they have not emerged strongly in all 
countries that have experienced anti-immigrant hostility and differ somewhat in their 
ideological roots and form.
207
 Despite these variations, the New Right shares the 
fundamental trait of a hostile, belligerent rhetoric concerning ‗foreigners‘ or immigrants 
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and an intense opposition to immigration.
208
 Some scholars have argued that the growing 
popularity of the New Right is largely an expression of the widespread prejudice against 
immigrants among West European populations. These parties have channelled growing 
anxieties and unease over broader (social and economic) changes in Europe and 
manipulated general resentment over immigration to their advantage. They have used 
new and old myths surrounding immigration, culture, and national identity to expand 
their sphere of influence in these countries.  
 
In several Western European countries, the pervasiveness and popularity of the 
New Right has reached an alarming level. They have assumed positions of political 
importance at the regional, national and local level, successfully introducing their 
exclusionary agenda to the centre-stage of mainstream politics.  Even in countries where 
they are less powerful politically, they vitiate the political and social scene by breeding 
intolerance and fear of diversity. More alarmingly, they negatively influence mainstream 
parties to adopt an inflexible stance towards immigration. Mainstream political parties in 
countries that have experienced strong growth in the far right have openly embraced the 
xenophobic rhetoric of these parties.
209
  
 
Many examples can be given, especially in the context of Western Europe. The 
Front National (or National Front) for instance, which is currently the third largest 
political party in France, has campaigned using an aggressively anti-immigrant program 
that calls for a moratorium on immigration, forcible expulsion of ‗non-white‘ immigrants, 
and radical restructuring of citizenship laws.
210
 At a political rally in April 2007, Front 
National leader Jean-Marie Le Pen asserted that immigration represented a threat to 
France: ‗This is just the start of mass immigration. If we do nothing, we will be 
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submerged.‘211 Le Pen gained prominence during the 1980s with his infamous slogan 
connecting immigration with unemployment: ‗two million unemployed, two million 
migrants.‘212  
 
The Vlaams Blok, issued a seventy-point xenophobic program in 1991 aimed at 
establishing an independent and homogeneous Flemish homeland in Belgium. The 
program included a ‗watertight‘ end to immigration, immediate expulsion of migrants 
who were undocumented, convicted of criminal activity or unemployed for more than 
three months, ‗discouragement‘ and ‗encouragement‘ measures for legal migrants to quit 
the country, and segregated schools and residences for natives and immigrants. The 
party‘s platform has received increasing electoral support in recent years. 213 Although a 
2005 High Court ruling forced the party to disband, it managed to collect 23 and 24 
percent of the votes in European and Flemish polls in 2004 signalling strong support for 
its policies.
214
  
 
  Less popular than some of its European counterparts, the mandate of the British 
National Party (BNP) clearly excludes ethnic minorities by seeking to guarantee ‗the 
continued existence, as the clearly dominant ethnic, cultural and political group, of the 
native peoples of these islands—the English, Scots, Irish and Welsh—together with the 
limited numbers of peoples of European descent who arrived as refugees or economic 
immigrants centuries or decades ago, and who have fully integrated into our society.‘215 
 
In April 2008, Italians brought back to power the centre-right coalition 
government of Silvio Berlesconi‘s People of Freedom Party and its ally, the far right 
Northern League party, approving an election campaign that crudely linked crime and 
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immigration.
216
 The Northern League scored more than 8 percent of the votes, doubling 
its performance from the previous election. One of its election posters featured an 
aboriginal with the caption: ‗They were also subjected to immigration and now they live 
on reserves.‘217 The Northern League‘s fierce resistance to immigration had been evident 
earlier as well. In June 2003, the League‘s leader Umberto Bossi allegedly informed an 
Italian newspaper that boats carrying irregular migrants should be shot out of the water 
with cannons:  
 
After the second or third warning, boom…the cannon roars. Without any beating 
about the bush, the cannon that blows everyone out of the water. Otherwise, this 
business will never end. Illegal migrants must be hounded out, either nicely or 
nastily…There comes a time when it is necessary to resort to the use of force.218  
 
In 2007, the UN Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance asked the Swiss government to 
explain inflammatory campaign posters created and widely distributed by the right-wing 
Swiss People‘s Party (Schweizerische Volkspartei or SVP).219 Now the strongest party in 
Switzerland, the SVP‘s poster featured three white sheep kicking a black sheep against 
the backdrop of the Swiss flag with the caption ‗for more security.‘220 Another poster 
featured several black hands grabbing a stack of Swiss passports above the phrase ‗stop 
mass naturalizations.‘221 An SVP member declared that ‗the black sheep is not any black 
sheep that does not fit into the family. It‘s the foreign criminal who doesn‘t belong here, 
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the one that doesn‘t obey Swiss law. We don‘t want him.‘222 Claiming that immigrants 
commit a disproportionate share of violent crimes and abuse Swiss social and welfare 
benefits, one of the party‘s 2007 election platforms was to push for a law that would 
sanction the immediate deportation of immigrant families whose member(s) were found 
guilty of crime or benefits fraud.
223
   
 
Even though attention has centered largely on more well-known far right political 
formations, smaller fringe groups that actively engage in hate crimes motivated by 
xenophobia and racism are flourishing in areas like Russia. A recent report on the 
Russian Federation by Doudou Diene, the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of 
racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance noted this disturbing 
development.
224
 Russian officials have estimated their numbers to be between 10,000 and 
20,000 while human rights groups give a much higher estimate of 50,000.
225
    
 
Cultural differences between migrant and host populations can contribute to 
hostility towards selected migrant groups, especially when there is striking diversity.
226
 
The 2008 Annual Report of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) 
notes that non-Western cultural attire, like headscarves for Muslim women, made them 
more visible targets of xenophobic attacks.
227
 In newer manifestations of racism and 
xenophobia, cultural differences and identities are playing an increasingly important part. 
In Europe, Stolcke argues that cultural identity, traditions, and heritage have 
circumscribed the contemporary rhetoric of national inclusion and exclusion.
228
 
Immigrants from the poor south, and more recently from the east, are seen as ‗strangers‘ 
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or ‗alien‘ to the common cultural heritage of Europeans. This form of ‗cultural 
fundamentalism‘ invokes the notion of a homogeneous culture tied to nationality, 
citizenship, and territory.
229
  
 
While all non-Western cultures are seen as threatening to some extent, certain 
cultural traditions are now being seen as fundamentally incompatible with European 
values. In particular, cultural values and practices of Muslim immigrants have become 
central to current political debates on immigrant integration and incorporation in 
countries like the Netherlands, France and Germany. Because it is not expressed in 
overtly racist terms, the new ‗symbolic‘ or ‗cultural‘ racism, which uses the logic of 
seemingly insurmountable cultural incompatibilities, is far more socially acceptable than 
‗biological racism‘ (based on color and racial differences).230 This new manifestation of 
racism in Europe is a combination of racism and xenophobia. Fekete terms it as ‗xeno-
racism‘ suggesting that it is racist in substance yet xenophobic in form. 231 ‗Xeno-racism‘ 
simultaneously perpetuates racism in a new guise and conceals its sharp opposition to 
immigrants.      
 
Some scholars prefer to see xenophobia as having historical roots. For some, 
xenophobia is the direct consequence of intensified and uneven globalization. 
Globalization is seen as a paradoxical set of processes marked with real closures in a 
celebratory rhetoric of borderless flows and boundless opportunities.
232
 With its emphasis 
on the free movement of capital, globalization has accentuated the economic disparities 
between countries and regions. It has also sharpened the divisions between social classes, 
and rural and urban areas within these countries. This in turn exacerbates, rather than 
diminishes, migration pressures. As flows of capital, goods, and people rise, it weakens 
the boundaries of states. Contradictorily, nation-states attempt to manage these 
transnational impulses by trying to stem the flow of migrants through stronger 
immigration controls, directed largely at unskilled and involuntary migrants. The 
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emergence, under globalization, of transnational migrant communities who display 
loyalties and affiliations with both receiving and origin countries, are seen as a further 
challenge to the sovereignty and character of nation-states. The tensions between nation-
states and migratory flows are therefore magnified through deepening globalization. 
 
The restructuring of global labour markets places migrants increasingly in the 
peripheral service sectors that often exclude possibilities of citizenship and makes them 
more vulnerable to exploitation.
233
 The acceleration of flows (of capital, goods and 
people) heightens citizens‘ anxieties and fears, stimulating a stronger fixation with 
belonging and identities, which in turn exaggerates exclusionary tendencies through 
xenophobia and other intolerances.
234
 These insecurities are managed by treating migrant 
groups as ‗unwanted‘ and making them scapegoats for social problems, thus exacerbating 
their social insecurity.   
 
Another common stream of materialist analysis proposes that real competition 
over limited resources contributes to xenophobic sentiments among native populations. 
During periods of economic crisis when resources shrink and jobs and housing are scarce, 
rivalry between migrants and natives becomes more acute. Here, immigration is seen as a 
more or less negative force whose outcomes are almost always detrimental for host 
populations. Migrant inflows decrease the numbers of jobs available for citizens, create a 
surplus pool of labour, and result in reduced wages for both citizens and migrants. 
Another version views immigration as a ‗zero sum game‘ where the benefits from in-
flows are offset or neutralized by the costs associated with it.  
 
It has been argued by some that perceived rather than real economic threats 
contribute to xenophobic tendencies. Fears and anxieties are generally elevated during 
uncertain economic circumstances. Consequently, people in weaker economic 
circumstances or lower classes exhibit the highest propensity to develop xenophobic 
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attitudes. For example, results from the 2003 Eurobarometer survey reveal that 
individuals in the lowest income category displayed the strongest hostility towards 
migrant groups.
235
 SAMP‘s 2006 survey of South African attitudes made a similar 
finding.
236
 Scholars like O‘Connell have contradictorily shown that anti-immigrant 
hostility is also displayed by some affluent communities and wealthier countries.
237
 Some 
of the recent anti-immigrant political movements in Western Europe have appeared in 
some of the wealthiest countries.    
 
The evidence and opinion on the economic impact of immigration is rather mixed. 
Some researchers have established that immigration does affect the economy adversely, 
increasing unemployment.
238
 Conversely, other scholars argue that immigration has a 
mostly beneficial influence on host populations. The latter have argued that the 
relationship between economic structures and population size is not so straightforward. 
The idea that migrants ‗steal‘ jobs is based on the flawed notion that the number of jobs 
in an economy is fixed.
239
 Immigrants often create jobs in host countries thereby 
benefitting local economies.
240
 This is very much the case when they are employed in the 
informal sector. Immigrants also provide a valuable service for host populations by often 
performing the worst jobs in host societies, unwanted by native workers who reject the 
very low wages. Rates of unemployment have little to do with population size and 
density. Rather, it is economic structures and cycles that influence the rate of 
unemployment.
241
 Some of the world‘s most densely populated countries (Singapore for 
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example) are also among the most wealthy. Population size and density have little to do 
with the rates of unemployment.  
 
Adding more people to a country through immigration may not always reduce 
average national income, it may even enhance it. Receiving countries even benefit from 
irregular migration because it is largely these migrants who form a flexible workforce, 
providing extra labour when needed but easily discarded during lean periods. During 
economic downturns, not all native populations have exhibited high levels of animosity 
towards immigrants, and citizens of some countries have expressed animosity even 
during periods of modest economic growth.
242
 This conflict does not emerge from real 
competition in the labour market but from the perception of competition.  
 
Though they can be treated as contextual factors, xenophobic tendencies are 
responsive to broader changes in political, social, and economic structures. The strength 
of xenophobia may vary with different social, economic, and political conditions, 
suppressed at certain times and re-appearing in strength at others. Pain‘s analysis of 
xenophobia in Russia reveals that the collapse of the old Soviet Union, the demise of 
communism and a general disintegration of Soviet society have all played a part in the 
emergence of an aggressive nationalism that opposes the entry of immigrants.
243
 In 
Europe, the political and economic integration of countries into the European Union (EU) 
has sharpened these differential tendencies. As the internal boundaries of the EU have 
become more permeable, the external boundaries have been more tightly closed.
244
 Other 
scholars have linked the events of 9/11 to the ‗securitization‘ of migration where 
international migration is linked to terrorism and becomes a ‗security threat.‘245 A meta-
politics of immigration emerges where it not only becomes a threat to ‗our‘ jobs, income, 
housing or culture, but also a threat to the lives of citizens.  
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Wieworka‘s analysis links the escalation of xenophobia, racism, and differential 
nationalism to modernity and the structural transformation of industrial societies in what 
he terms ‗destructuration.‘246 The decline in industries through the closing of factories as 
well as the decay in the working class movement has created a social and economic 
dualization in these societies. Unlike the past, where people had a strong sense of 
belonging to a society, a growing proportion feel excluded and marginalized, creating 
conditions for renewed expressions of xenophobia and racism. Those who are ‗out‘ 
experience a loss of social identity, blaming their misfortunes on migrants, even if the 
latter share the same experience. Another aspect of destructuration is that state and public 
institutions are increasingly unable to fulfill their welfare functions, which exacerbates 
insecurity and the tendency to seek scapegoats. These changes also activate political 
debates about nation, nationality and citizenship but the progressive dimensions of 
nationalism are eroded. National identity is increasingly tied to racist and xenophobic 
expressions.   
 
The media has often been criticized for subtly and not-so-subtly fanning the 
flames of xenophobic sentiment in many countries.  Analyses of representative articles on 
RASIM (Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, Immigrants and Migrants) in British newspapers 
between 1996 and 2006 showed that a small number of topics were used to portray them, 
displaying a largely negative stance.
247
 These topics centered on exaggerated numbers, 
depreciatory constructions of RASIM as an economic burden (as abusers of welfare), 
threat to cultural and community values, danger, and legality issues.
248
 Refugees and 
asylum-seekers were commonly portrayed using water metaphors like ‗flood,‘ ‗waves,‘ 
‗pour‘ and ‗stream‘ constructing them as an ‗out-of-control, agent-less, unwanted natural 
disaster.‘249 The term ‗immigrant‘ constantly carried an uncomplimentary connotation 
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discussed largely in the context of non-positive topics like ‗immigrants and illegality‘ and 
‗immigrants as/and problems.‘250 Many newspapers used nonsensical terms to describe 
RASIM like ‗illegal refugees/asylum-seekers‘ and ‗bogus im/migrants‘ establishing the 
boundaries of those who merited inclusion while underscoring the negative aspects of 
immigration.
251
 The most commonly-used stereotype of a RASIM member was ‗a 
different-looking (generally non-Caucasian), healthy (but lazy) adult, a single male with 
no or little educational or professional skills.‘252 
 
The Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR)‘s study on UK media coverage of 
asylum-related issues found that some 22 million residents or more than one-third of the 
British population subscribed on a frequent basis to four large British newspapers that 
consistently demonized asylum-seekers through false, inaccurate and distorted stories 
about them.
253
 Like other research critical of media portrayals of immigration, this study 
argues that negative press on a large and frequent scale has a direct and damaging 
influence on public opinion. People believe what they read in newspapers because it 
confirms their prejudices and legitimizes existing hostility.
254
 When harmful myths on 
immigration and immigrants are not challenged, they are normalized and accepted as 
facts. Another IPPR study showed that many British citizens believed false stories about 
asylum-seekers including those printed in tabloid newspapers, like asylum-seekers 
receiving free golf lessons, swimming lessons or bus passes.
255
 ‗It was in the local paper 
that they [asylum-seekers] get free bus passes whereas old people have to pay‘ was how 
one respondent described it.
256
  
 
                                                 
250
 KhosraviNik, Majid 2009 ‗The representation of refugees, asylum-seekers and immigrants in British 
newspapers: a critical discourse analysis‘, Journal of Language and Politics, 8 (3), forthcoming 
251
 Gabrielatos, Costas and Paul Baker 2008 ‗Fleeing, sneaking, flooding: a corpus analysis of discursive 
constructions of refugees and asylum-seekers in the UK press, 1996-2005‘, Journal of English Linguistics, 
36 (1), pp. 5-38  
252
 KhosraviNik, Majid 2008 ‗British newspapers and the representation of refugees, asylum-seekers and 
immigrants‘, p. 36 
253
 Greenslade, Roy 2005 ‗Seeking scapegoats: the coverage of asylum in the UK press‘, Asylum and 
Migration Working Paper No. 5, IPPR: London 
254
 See Rydgren, Jens 2004 ‗The logic of xenophobia‘, Rationality and Society, 16 (2), pp. 123-48 
255
 Lewis, Miranda 2005 Asylum: Understanding Public Attitudes, IPPR: London, pp. 28 
256
 Ibid, p. 35 
 58 
Studies from diverse social, political, and geographical contexts display 
disturbing similarities in negative imagery and rampant use of stereotypes in migrant 
representation.
257
 A study of press coverage in Slovenia showed that words like 
‗crowding,‘ ‗swamping,‘ ‗besieging,‘ and ‗flooding‘ were repetitively used in reference 
to immigration.
258
 Migrants were dehumanized by referring routinely to ‗hunt‘ for 
‗illegals.‘ Like other countries, articles perpetually accentuated the fear and sense of 
threat posed by the migrants: ‗Crime in Siskia…has literally blossomed,‘ ‗all the 
foreigners are becoming an excessive burden for our country,‘ ‗all the costs have to be 
paid by us penniless citizens, who ourselves are already living on the edge of poverty‘ 
and ‗illegals can swamp little Slovenia.‘259 ‗What in the name of God, Allah, Buddha or 
the animist deities can these foreigners do for us to accept them more willingly and 
easily, nothing,‘ observed a journalist while another pointed out that ‗a lot of all this is 
wrong because some people just have rights but others just have duties.‘260 
 
In Australia, the media has been blamed by many commentators for the outbreak 
of anti-immigrant violence in Sydney in 2005. On December 11
th
 an estimated five to 
seven thousand people (most under the age of twenty-five) took to the streets in the beach 
suburb of Cronulla to demonstrate their frustration toward the appearance of people of 
Middle Eastern descent, on ‗their‘ beach.261 In the days leading up to the riot, newspapers 
and talk-radio hosts frequently repeatedly broadcast the racist text messages that had been 
sent out to drum up support for the rally. The day before the attack The Daily Telegraph 
published an article with the first line, ‗Cronulla is a suburb under siege.‘ Most media 
failed to accurately report on the event that sparked the riot – an attack on three young 
surf lifesavers the previous weekend by a group of Lebanese youth.  
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The Australian media widely publicised the attack. They reported that the young 
men of ‗Middle Eastern appearance‘ had been swimming outside the flags which are 
posted by surf lifesavers to denote where it was safe to swim. When approached by three 
surf lifesavers and asked to swim only within the flags, the group of ‗thugs‘ (which 
ranges in number from four to twenty-five in articles in The Daily Telegraph alone) 
instead responded with a violent attack. What the media failed to acknowledge however, 
was that the surf lifesavers were out of uniform, and it therefore would have been 
impossible to identify them as such. In addition, the group of young men were apparently 
taunted with calls of ‗Lebs can‘t swim‘ before the attack took place.262 It was in fact not a 
random, unprovoked, attack. The stories and discussions published by the media no doubt 
encouraged many people to participate in the riot and are probably largely responsible for 
the great numbers that eventually turned up in support of Cronulla ‗locals.‘ 
 
A Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) study of press coverage on 
immigration in South Africa found that a large number of articles frequently used racial 
and national stereotypes to describe migrants from other African countries such as 
‗Mozambicans as car thieves‘ and ‗Nigerians as drug smugglers.‘263 Coverage was 
largely negative with many news articles and features using anti-immigrant frames by 
uncritically reproducing dubious statistics and flawed assumptions about immigration. 
Twenty-five percent of the articles used sensational headlines that reinforced myths and 
stereotypes about migrant groups, like ‗Illegals in SA add to decay of cities,‘ ‗6 million 
migrants headed our way‘ and ‗Africa floods into Cape Town.‘264    
 
A more recent SAMP study of media representation of immigration in Southern 
African countries between 2001 and 2003 included South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia 
and Botswana. It found that despite some improvement since the 1990s, coverage was 
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largely negative and unanalytical.
265
 Pejorative images of migrants as ‗job-stealers,‘ 
‗criminals‘ and ‗illegals‘ were still being perpetuated in articles. However, the most 
negative coverage was seen in Botswana and Namibia. In Botswana, 45 percent of 
articles made at least one negative reference to migration, singling out Zimbabwean 
migrants in particular for derision and ridicule. In Namibia, the press frequently described 
migrants and refugees as ‗illegal‘ and openly associated criminal activity with Angolan 
and Zimbabwean migrants.  
 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES FOR MIGRANT AND HOST 
POPULATIONS 
 
Without exception, human development outcomes of xenophobia for migrant and 
host populations are negative, pernicious, and damaging. The persistence or growth of 
xenophobia in receiving societies seriously diminishes the benefits and positive returns 
from international migration for migrant groups, receiving countries, and countries of 
origin. Xenophobia undermines democratic structures and liberal values along with 
principles of equality, fairness and social justice. It erodes universally accepted human 
rights standards and creates a global milieu in which discrimination against, and ill-
treatment, of non-citizens becomes acceptable and tolerated. The contemporary 
resurgence of xenophobia has challenged and even weakened the international human 
rights framework. Xenophobia is tied to the decline in liberal values in Western 
democracies and the growing popularity of new forms of exclusionary thinking. 
Xenophobic attacks on migrant groups represent a threat to social order and justice which 
encourages lawlessness.  
 
As the victims and targets of xenophobia and discrimination, migrant groups are 
the most adversely affected. In situations of heightened xenophobia, migrants have to 
endure the perpetual threat of violence and victimization in their lives.  Xenophobia thus 
exacerbates the vulnerability of migrant groups, exposing them to regular harassment, 
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intimidation, and abuse by citizens, employers, and enforcement agencies in receiving 
states. The weak social position of migrant groups in host countries has been extensively 
documented.  A new study by the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) 
shows that both documented and undocumented migrants in South Africa live in a state 
of ‗permanent insecurity,‘ facing coercion and aggravation on a frequent basis by police 
personnel.
266
 During the inspection of state-issued IDs, police officers commonly demand 
bribes, money and goods from migrants. They also subject migrants to physical and 
verbal abuse. Women migrants are especially vulnerable to sexual exploitation.  
 
While xenophobia has an adverse effect on all categories of migrants, some 
migrants are much more prone to victimization than others. Above all, irregular migrants 
are extremely susceptible, due largely to their lack of status in receiving states. In 
Malaysia, for instance, apprehended irregular migrants have been subjected to detention, 
caning and imprisonment.
267
 Immigration-enforcement agencies like RELA routinely 
employ aggressive methods during raids to detect irregular migrants. In a similar manner, 
when asylum-seekers and refugees are treated as ‗illegal‘ migrants, they can endure harsh 
treatment at the hands of authorities. They can face long periods in detention centers and 
experience poor conditions of confinement, including inadequate food, housing, and 
medical facilities.
268
   
 
Research has highlighted the frequent assault on the human dignity and self-
respect of migrants in receiving states. In Libya, African migrants from sub-Saharan 
countries have faced brutality and verbal insults by locals, including children, while 
conducting their daily lives.
269
 In situations where immigrant groups are demonized as 
‗threats‘ and ‗problems,‘ they are even more socially excluded. The new ‗securitization‘ 
of migration has brought renewed negative attention to migrant groups, increasing their 
powerlessness. It has created an unstable social situation and exacerbated the risks of 
physical violence between natives and migrants. In India, for instance, Bangladeshi 
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migrants are treated with suspicion by police and intelligence agencies because of the 
popular belief that they harbour terrorists or are engaged in terrorist activities.
270
 
Bangladeshi migrants have been rounded up and detained in police custody following 
bomb blasts in cities like Jaipur and New Delhi.
271
 
  
When migrants are made scapegoats for various problems, the result is to increase 
the social distance between migrant and local populations. Contact between them is 
reduced and these groups are prevented from interacting socially or developing friendly 
relations that can correct biases and prejudices. In this respect, xenophobia has an 
unfavourable impact on social cohesion. Besides, it contributes to shrinking tolerance and 
respect for other cultures and fosters the distrust of diversity in societies.  
 
Prolonged mistreatment of migrants in host countries can exacerbate social 
inequalities between migrant and non-migrant populations. That is, xenophobia impedes 
the social and economic integration of migrants in receiving societies. This trend is 
already being witnessed in many receiving states where migrants face discrimination in 
areas like employment, housing, health and education. In terms of employment, migrant 
groups often take up undesirable, unskilled, jobs that pay low wages, involve long hours 
and provide few benefits. They can be placed in jobs where there is little possibility of 
upward mobility, that contribute to de-skilling, and are paid lower wages than native 
workers. This situation can be even worse for marginal migrant groups, like irregular 
migrants and asylum-seekers, who often endure conditions of super-exploitation at work. 
In Indian cities, many Bangladeshi migrants perform ‗dirty‘ scavenging work like the 
collection and recycling of garbage and waste material, a task traditionally performed by 
the lowest, untouchable Indian caste groups.
272
   
 
An International Labour Organization (ILO) study on Burmese child migrant 
workers, carried out by the Federation of Trade Unions – Burma (FTUB) in Mae Sot, 
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Thailand, shows that they were ‗working day and night, week after week, for wages that 
were far below the legal minimum wage, to the point of absolute exhaustion.‘273 Nearly 
half of the respondents were seventeen years old and some were as young as twelve years 
of age. Many of them had been enrolled in schools in Myanmar. Another study on 
Indonesian domestic workers in Malaysia has documented the slave-like conditions of 
employment, with migrants generally working sixteen to eighteen hour days seven days a 
week.
274
 Many domestic workers were socially isolated, forbidden to leave the house or 
maintain contact with outsiders.  Many employers also withheld their salaries which 
meant that migrants often endured dire work conditions or worked illegally to earn 
sufficient money to return to their home communities. Sometimes, employers even 
confiscated the worker‘s passport, preventing them from leaving abusive situations. 
 
Similarly, migrant groups often face discrimination in access to basic health-care. 
In Malaysia, irregular migrants and asylum-seekers are reluctant to seek medical 
treatment because hospitals are required to inform authorities. Even pregnant women who 
have gone to hospital for delivery have not been exempted; they have been arrested with 
their newborn soon after delivery.
275
 An MSF briefing paper on Malaysia reveals that 
many irregular migrants are unable to afford medical care. Both irregular migrants and 
refugees face linguistic and financial barriers to obtain health services.
276
 The paper 
further records the sub-standard living conditions of these groups in jungle locations to 
evade apprehension and deportation. Others had set up small huts with no electricity or 
toilets and were susceptible to infections. Bangladeshi migrants occupy make-shifts 
shanties in the most undesirable marginal spaces of slums in Indian cities, located near 
open sewers, railway lines or bridges.
277
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Xenophobia legitimizes cruel and degrading treatment of migrants and refugees. 
Continued discriminatory treatment of migrant groups can contribute, in the long-term, to 
the emergence of a new social underclass. In many contexts, migrants already represent 
some of the most marginalized, weak and exploited groups in host societies, 
economically and socially disadvantaged by virtue of their foreign origin. They can exist 
in a state of social isolation and alienation in receiving states. Above all, it creates a 
situation in which increased social insecurity is experienced not only by migrant 
populations but by other minority and marginalized groups as well. In this respect, 
xenophobia adversely impacts and enhances other forms of discrimination. For example, 
weak citizenship verification systems in India have led to the victimization of poor 
Muslim and Bengali communities during state operations to detect and deport irregular 
migrant Bangladeshis.
278
 Some of those identified as Bangladeshis, and subsequently 
deported, were in reality legitimate citizens. Likewise, provinces like Assam and 
Maharashtra that have displayed some of the strongest antipathy towards migrant 
Bangladeshis have also witnessed brutal attacks in recent times on Indian migrants from 
other provinces like Bihar, Bengal, and Uttar Pradesh.
279
  
  
POLICY RESPONSES 
 
What kinds of policy response have there been to counter xenophobia and how successful 
are they? When countries in the North obstruct the rights of refugees to seek safe haven, 
they set an extremely negative example for other states, especially those in the South that 
host a majority of the world‘s refugees.280 Similarly in the case of migrant labour, many 
developing countries are now opting to emulate developed host countries that have 
adopted restrictive and discriminatory policies.  
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Bad Practices 
 
Notwithstanding the sovereign right of states to include or exclude migrants, immigrants, 
refugees and asylum-seekers from their territories, state policies on immigration can 
directly and indirectly heighten xenophobia. Equally importantly, practices adopted by 
state agencies like police, immigration officials, and other enforcement agencies can 
perform a contributory role in inciting and perpetuating xenophobia.  
  
From the late 1990s onwards, many destination countries adopted ever-narrower 
policies and rescinded their acceptance and tolerance of the presence of migrants, 
including irregular migrants. For example, Tanzania, which was long recognized as an 
exemplary host to tens of thousands of refugees, began imposing a series of harsh 
policies against refugees in 2003. From May 2006 to May 2007, the country expelled 
nearly 15,000 Rwandans and several thousand Burundians, some of them registered 
refugees, by closing down schools and ending employment programs for them. Amnesty 
International has claimed that many refugees were harassed, beaten and had their 
property confiscated during the expulsions.
281
  
 
In early 2008, Tanzania forcibly repatriated more than 150 Burundian refugees for 
violating the restrictive terms of the Refugees Act.
282
 These refugees had been 
apprehended by a special police unit while they were collecting firewood outside the 
camps in violation of terms laid out in the Refugees Act. The Act requires all asylum-
seekers and refugees to live in refugee camps or settlements designated by the Tanzanian 
government. It further imposes severe limitations on their movement outside the camps. 
Failure to comply with the rules can result in a jail sentence of up to six months and fines 
of nearly 50,000 shillings ($45). In addition, the Act forbids refugees from working 
without a permit though the procedure for obtaining the permits remains unclear. So far, 
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no refugee has been granted the permit. Similar restraining measures have been put in 
place for migrant labour in countries like Malaysia and Thailand.  
 
Destination countries often refuse to accept asylum-seekers as refugees, treating 
them as ‗illegal immigrants‘ or ‗illegal aliens.‘ The erosion of the international 
framework for refugee protection has been noted with concern by refugee-advocacy 
groups like the UNHCR. In 2006, Antonio Guterres, the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees made these disturbing observations: 
 
Abuse of the asylum system is a hot topic among industrialized nations, especially 
in the European Union. But the abuse of asylum seekers is not. The EU, Council 
of Europe, and the UN have between them assembled an impressive array of 
bodies to deal with the wider issues of racism and xenophobia. But these 
discussions have been drowned out by other political debates.
283
 
 
Countries may also adopt severe policies that discriminate against migrants and 
violate the basic and human rights of immigrants. In 1993, the newly appointed Côte 
d‘Ivoire President Konan Bedie swiftly reversed the generous ‗open door‘ immigration 
policy of his predecessor by introducing the constricted notion of ‗Akwaba‘ or 
‗Ivoirite.‘284 Implemented primarily as a tactic to crush his main political opponent, 
Alassane Outtara, this new policy decreed that only residents who were born of Ivorian 
parents and were ethnically ‗pure‘ could claim citizenship.285 As a result, nearly one-
fourth of the country‘s population of 17 million, especially those in the northern and 
western parts of the country, were disenfranchised, and labelled as ‗foreigners.‘ 
Especially affected were migrants and refugees from neighbouring countries like Guinea, 
Burkina Faso, Mali and Liberia who had migrated to Côte d‘Ivoire in previous decades. 
They had been previously allowed to own land and freely integrate into the Ivorian 
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society. Also affected were descendants of migrants, some of them third or fourth 
generation progeny who had lived all their lives in the country.  
 
Even though Bedie was overthrown in a military coup in 2000, his successor 
General Robert Guei continued along a similar xenophobic path by bringing in a 
constitutional amendment that would exclusively permit ‗pure‘ Ivorians to contest the 
elections. Xenophobic violence flared up yet again in Côte d‘Ivoire in September 2002 
after military installations were attacked in Abidjan, Bouake and Korhogo.
286
 Perceived 
as an attempted coup d‘ etat by foreign elements, widespread harassment and attacks on 
those deemed ‗foreigners‘ were reported. It is believed that some 20,000 immigrant 
households lost their homes to the violence in Abidjan.
287
 
 
Governments in host countries can unjustly attribute various problems 
encountered by citizens like crime and unemployment to migrants. In many countries, 
migrants and refugees have been characterized by mainstream politicians and government 
officials as ‗problems.‘  Of late, they have been portrayed as a threat to national security. 
In his recent election campaign, Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlesconi described 
irregular migrants as the ‗army of evil.‘288 A senior Libyan government official informed 
Human Rights Watch that if the country accepted refugees, ‗they would come like 
locusts.‘289 Biased attitudes of government officials and inflammatory statements about 
migrants often consolidate prevailing stereotypes about migrants and refugees. In his 
address to the nation in May 2006, former President George W Bush linked irregular 
migrants to several troubles faced by the United States: ‗Illegal immigration puts pressure 
on public schools and hospitals. It strains state and local budgets, and brings crime to our 
communities [emphasis in original].‘290  
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State authorities can incite xenophobic sentiments by targeting specific groups of 
immigrants or refugees. In September 2000, Guinean President Lansana Conte reversed 
his country‘s longstanding support for refugees from Sierra Leone and Liberia by 
publicly accusing them of protecting rebels and militias, holding them responsible for 
frequent cross-border attacks.
291
 In a radio and television address, he openly declared: ‗I 
am giving orders that we bring together all foreigners in [Guinean] neighborhoods so that 
we know what they are doing and that we search and arrest suspects. Civilians and 
soldiers, let‘s defend our country together. Crush the invaders.‘292 Guinea hosted about 
125,000 Liberian and 330,000 Sierra Leonean refugees at that time, many of whom had 
fled civil war and gross human rights violations in their home countries.
293
 Afterwards, 
thousands of refugees were violently attacked, beaten, raped, detained by police, ousted 
from their homes, and had their property stolen in the capital Conakry.
294
 A refugee 
informed Human Rights Watch: ‗In Guinea, I am afraid of three types of people: the 
government, the citizens, the rebels. In Sierra Leone, there is just one: the rebels.‘295  
 
Destination countries also crucially shape the treatment of migrants and 
immigrants in other ways. They can perpetuate migrants‘ exploitation by disregarding the 
ill-treatment of migrants and refugees at the hands of employers, police, government 
officials and citizens. They can also continue the discrimination against migrants by 
failing to put into place measures to safeguard migrant rights. When host states adopt 
highly punitive measures to control irregular migration that include difficult conditions of 
detention and imprisonment, they can easily create a sense of crisis or siege regarding 
immigration and exacerbate existing hostility towards immigrants. In July 2008, for 
example, the Italian senate agreed to impose tough new measures to curb irregular 
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migration. These include extended jail sentences from four to six years and confiscation 
of properties rented to irregular migrants.
296
 In mid-June 2008, the European Parliament 
accepted a proposal to hold irregular migrants in detention centers for up to eighteen 
months, and to ban expelled migrants from re-entering the European Union for up to five 
years.
297
 
 
Certainly there is a major role to be played by independent human rights 
watchdogs in every country where migrants are ill-treated, but governments do not tend 
to respond well to what is often very damaging information about their policies and 
practices. 
 
Malaysian authorities, for example, have reacted harshly to criticism of their 
immigration practices. Following the publication of a report by Irene Fernandez in 1996 
outlining the constant exploitation, sexual abuse, ill-treatment, and lack of adequate 
medical care for detained irregular migrant workers, the Malaysian government arrested 
and charged her with ‗maliciously publishing false news.‘298 The report, titled 
‗Memorandum on abuses, acts of torture and inhuman treatment towards migrant workers 
in detention camps‘ was conducted by Tenaganita, a migrant advocacy non-governmental 
organization co-founded by Fernandez. The report was based on interviews with 300 
irregular migrants in detention centers in 1994-95 for a research project on health and 
HIV/AIDs among migrant workers. Many of those interviewed for the report were from 
Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Philippines.
299
 It urged the authorities to establish an 
independent commission to examine the poor condition of migrants in detention centers 
and alleged human rights abuses within.
300
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Although the state authorities announced the setting up of an independent 
Visitors‘ Panel to inspect the centres, Fernandez underwent the longest trial in the 
country‘s history. During the trial, she testified 310 times. Former migrant workers who 
had been detained in the centres during the study period gave testimonies that supported 
the findings of the Tenaganita report. They revealed the regular beatings, cruel and 
humiliating punishment they were subjected to by the police guards. They further 
confirmed the inadequate conditions prevailing in the centres, including sub-standard 
nutrition, medical and sanitary conditions. On 16 October 2003, Fernandez was found 
guilty and sentenced to 12 months‘ imprisonment. Presiding magistrate Juliana Mohamed 
declared that the abuses outlined in the report were fabricated and the testimonies 
collected by Tenaganita had been acquired ‗without effort to obtain the truth in their 
statements.‘ Moreover, the court observed that since the memorandum had discredited 
the Malaysian nation, Irene Fernandez‘s case ‗must be made an example.‘ She was 
finally acquitted on 25 November 2008 thirteen years after she was first charged.
301
  
 
Good Practices 
 
Xenophobia is a growing global problem in migrant-destination countries of the 
North and, increasingly the South.  Examples of ―good practice‖ policy responses and 
effective, transferable solutions are not overly abundant.  This suggests the need for a 
fundamental re-evaluation both of the causes and persistence of xenophobia and how best 
its pernicious effects might be mitigated.   What are some of the more common ―good 
practice‖ responses to xenophobia?  And why has their impact to date been so limited?  
In answering these questions, it is clear that ad hoc, piecemeal and uncoordinated 
responses to the growing problem of xenophobia are insufficient and have little lasting 
effect.  The flurry of civil society and government initiatives in South Africa in the wake 
of the violence in May 2008 were ―crisis‖ responses to a deeper and more complex 
problem.  Many have since run out of steam and their impact is uncertain.  As that 
particular round of xenophobic violence recedes with the closure by government of all 
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camps for the internally-displaced, so the urgency of concerted action has receded. 
Meanwhile, the cancer of xenophobia continues to spread. 
 
There is clearly a need for greater monitoring and research on citizen attitudes to 
migrants, refugees and migration policy in states where xenophobia is a problem or is on 
the rise.  The information base on public attitudes is generally quite poor, particularly in 
the South. Anecdotal evidence is insufficient and general questions in endeavours such as 
the World Values Survey do not provide the kind of in-depth information that survey 
research can provide on the nature and reasons for particular attitudes, as well as the 
common stereotyping that accompanies intolerance. Such research would allow for 
evidence-based interventions and permit the assessment of the effectiveness of counter-
xenophobia measures and policies. 
 
While the causes and manifestations of xenophobia are clearly unique to each 
country, the fact that xenophobia is spreading as international migration increases does 
not mean that the solutions are similarly unique.  There is clearly a need for a coordinated 
global response to xenophobia and for international organizations to work in tandem with 
national governments and regional bodies in addressing the problem. It would be naïve to 
think that governments, on their own, will act unequivocally against xenophobia absent 
of pressure from civil society organizations and the courts.  The ideal scenario would see 
a coordinated plan by international bodies, government, civil society, labour and business 
being developed and implemented. 
 
‗Good practice‘ models are in short supply but they do need to be identified and 
evaluated and, where there are results or the promise of success, be widely disseminated.  
This could apply not only to government policies but also to civil society initiatives, to 
public education campaigns and to the media.  The core elements of a coordinated ―good 
practice‖ model would include: 
 
 Greater understanding of citizen attitudes to migrants, refugees and migration 
policy through research which also uncovers the root causes of xenophobia and 
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evaluates the effectiveness of interventions from the perspective of citizens and 
migrants; 
 Ratification and implementation of normative global standards on the protection 
of migrants such as the UN Migrant Workers Convention and relevant ILO 
conventions; 
 Global, regional and national monitoring of the treatment of migrants in 
destination countries; 
 National political leadership and will to acknowledge and condemn the presence 
of xenophobia and to advocate tolerance and the benefits of migration; 
 Legislative solutions including the criminalization of xenophohia as hate speech 
and appropriate sanctions against the perpetrators of xenophobic violence; 
 Identification and critical analysis of xenophobic discourse in the media and 
media education for reporters and editors; 
 Public education campaigns by the state and civil society to foster tolerance, build 
social cohesion and encourage diversity. 
 
1.  Measuring and Understanding Xenophobia 
 
The prevalence and manifestations of xenophobia can be measured by 
investigating the following: 
 
 Attitudes of the native population towards migrants, immigrants and refugees 
through public opinion surveys, both qualitative and quantitative.  
 Attitudes of political parties, both mainstream and extreme right-wing, towards 
immigration including critical analyses of legislative debates on immigration, 
speeches, interviews, and comments on immigration (overall and on particular 
groups of migrants) by politicians, and election manifestos of political parties. 
Other materials that can be examined are pamphlets, magazines and literature on 
immigration (especially on selected groups of immigrants such as refugees) 
sponsored by political parties.  Books and articles produced by 
ideologues/supporters of extreme-right wing parties can also be studied. 
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 Media depiction of immigration – How accurately does the mainstream media 
(print and other media) represent immigration-related issues? For example, 
analysis of print media through content like articles, features, op-ed pieces, letters 
to the editor, political cartoons and editorials can indicate the general level of 
acceptance for immigration and migrant groups. 
 Internet sites for groups strongly opposed to immigration like Migration Watch in 
the UK 
 Hate-sites set up by Neo-Nazi groups and state responses to such groups like 
stringent anti-hate crime legislation 
 Migrant/immigrant/refugees‘ lived experiences in host countries. What kind of 
social insecurity, intolerance and discrimination do they experience in their daily 
lives and how common is it? 
 Episodes of violent attacks on migrants and refugees can be assessed through 
media coverage of events, eye-witness narratives, and accounts produced by 
national/ international civil society groups and/or migrant advocacy groups. 
 Inventory or database of hate-crimes involving migrants and refugees as victims 
 States‘ policies on social cohesion, protection of the rights of migrants, and 
equally importantly, practices of immigration control. To what extent have states 
adopted and complied with international human rights instruments like the 
Refugee Convention?  
 Tolerance towards ethnic minorities in host countries. Generally, areas with low-
levels of tolerance towards minorities exhibit higher levels of xenophobia 
 
A systematic, coordinated program of applied research on xenophobia (such as 
that pioneered in countries such as South Africa and India) in the global South is 
imperative. This should have outcomes such as evidence-based public education and 
media strategies.    
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2. Normative Standards 
 
Responding to the unanimous appeal by participants at the World Conference on 
Human Rights, held at Vienna in 1993 to strengthen the international human rights 
mandate, the United Nations created the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner of Human Rights (OCHCR) the same year.
302
 It is the leading 
international body for the protection of human rights of all communities and groups. The 
Office closely monitors the human rights situation in countries and works closely with 
national bodies, governments, NGOs and the UN human rights monitoring system to 
build capacity, especially at the national level, to protect these rights.
303
 As far as 
international migration is concerned, the OCHCR views the protection of the human 
rights of migrant groups as central to migration management and policy.
 304
 It has set up 
an in-house Migration Task Force to review and work on migration-related topics.
305
 The 
Migration Task Force contributes to the activities of the UN Commission on Human 
Rights. The OHCHR drafts the annual report on the rights of migrants on behalf of the 
UN Secretary-General. It is a member of The Geneva Migration Group and has provided 
feedback to the Global Commission on International Migration and the Expert Group 
Meeting on International Migration and Development. It is also a member of the Steering 
Committee for the Ratification of the International Convention on the Rights of All 
Migrant Workers and members of Their Families (ICMW). 
 
The adoption of the ICMW by the UN General Assembly in 1990 delivered a new 
set of international norms for the protection of migrants and their family members. In 
contrast to other rights-based UN Conventions (such as the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination and the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
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Child), the ICMW has experienced a long and painful gestation.  At the latest count 
(March 2009), the Convention had 41 ratifications and 15 signatories.
306
  None of these 
countries are in the North and few are major migrant-receiving countries.
307
 The reasons 
for the global reluctance of states to ratify have been exhaustively examined by UNESCO 
but at root there is little enthusiasm for the fundamental idea that migrants should enjoy 
the same rights and legal and social protection as citizens and permanent residents.
308
  
None of the case study countries considered in this paper have ratified the Convention 
and some are actively opposed to it.   
 
Malaysia, for example, is far from unique in Asia in its opposition to the 
Convention.  However, it does have the poorest ratification record of UN instruments.  
There is little public debate about the rights of migrant workers, who keep a low profile 
‗apart from the odd riot by Indonesian workers.‘309 The Employment Act is deemed to 
offer sufficient protection but is not widely implemented. All migrant workers have been 
prohibited from marrying Malaysians and the government reportedly feels that if the 
Convention were ratified, the country would be ‗flooded‘ with migrants who could not be 
repatriated.  Extending protections to irregular migrants is generally viewed as 
unacceptable by the state and citizenry, as it is in South Africa.   
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South Africa has no official position on the UN Convention.  Indeed, at the top of 
the list of reasons for non-ratification is the lack of awareness and knowledge of the 
Convention itself.  Perhaps this is a debate that the state does not want to encourage, 
preferring to wait on the response of other migrant destination states, but many of the 
provisions of the Convention are not substantively different from what is already 
contained in South Africa‘s domestic policies and laws.310 However, for as long as 
migration policy continues to be a low priority issue for both government and civil 
society, the likelihood that South Africa will take the first steps towards ratifying the 
Convention is low.  On the other hand, the events of May 2008 might have prompted a 
broader debate about migrant rights, in general, and the UN Convention in particular.  
However, the opportunity was lost with the official denial that the violence had anything 
to do with xenophobia.      
 
The global campaign for the ratification of the Convention is gathering 
momentum but migrant receiving states are likely to continue to be hold-outs which 
significantly reduces the short-term prospect of the Convention‘s normative framework 
becoming implemented in those states of the North and South where migrants need its 
protections most.   In contrast to the GCIM and UNDP Secretary General‘s Report, the 
African Union has taken a position in support of the Convention, calling on all states to 
ratify in its Strategic Framework on Migration and in the African Common Position on 
Migration and Development.    The Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
has not endorsed the Convention or initiated a debate on ratification amongst its member 
states.  However, in response to the events in South Africa in 2008, SADC and the 
African Population Commission issued an important joint statement on xenophobia.
311
 
 
The SADC/ACP Statement on Xenophobia cites the African (Banjul) Charter 
on Human Rights and People‘s Rights, 1986; the Plan of Action of the 1994 International 
Conference on Migration and Development and the Programme of Action of the 2001 
World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related 
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Intolerance, but includes  no reference to the UN Migrant Workers Convention.  The 
Statement acknowledges, however, that ‗xenophobia can undermine sustainable political, 
social, economic development and regional integration.‘  It also notes that xenophobia 
causes ‗displacement of people, including women, children and the disabled, with dire 
social, health, economic and related consequences.‘ The states commit themselves to 
fight xenophobia through various national and regional policies and programmes and 
provides a 13-point plan of action including combating manifestations of rejection of 
migrants and discouraging all actions generating xenophobia; promoting peaceful co-
existence and tolerance of migrants; promoting respect for and protection of migrant 
rights through civic education; encouraging legal and orderly migration; establishing fair 
and effective procedures for refugee status determination; safeguarding the human 
security needs of refugees; engaging in public information and awareness campaigns on 
the plight and rights of refugees; disseminating information about migrants to promote 
respect and understanding of migrants; combating human trafficking and working closely 
with the UN, the private sector and civil society to address xenophobia and its 
consequences.  Issued in the heat of xenophobic violence, the SADC/ACP is a 
remarkably sober and pragmatic response to what it identifies as the ‗scourge of 
xenophobia.‘   There is little evidence, almost a year on, that any of the member states 
have actually acted on the many practical policy measures contained in the Statement. 
 
3. Global Monitoring 
 
The general disinterest in migrant rights in the 1980s and 1990s (exemplified by 
the lukewarm response to the UN Convention on Migrant Workers) encouraged the UN 
to adopt measures to monitor the position of migrants in destination countries.  In 1999, 
the OCHCR created the position of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of 
Migrants. The Rapporteur works to eliminate the violations of human rights of migrants, 
immigrants, and refugees, including irregular or undocumented migrants.
312
 The mandate 
of the Rapporteur extends to all countries, even those that have not ratified the 
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International Convention on the Protection of Rights of all Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families. S/he invites and acts on information provided by various 
sources on the abuse and discrimination against migrants, sends appeals and messages to 
concerned governments informing them of the situation and/or inviting a response from 
them, conducts fact-finding missions to various countries to assess the status of migrants 
and refugees on the invitation of the Government, presents an annual report to the UN 
Human Rights Council on the global state of protection of migrants, and provides 
suggestions to promote migrant rights.
313
 Over the past four years, the current 
commissioner Jorge Bustamante has undertaken visits to Indonesia, South Korea, 
Burkina Faso, Peru, Italy and Iran.
314
 On 5 June 2008, the mandate of the Rapporteur was 
extended for another three years.    
 
More than a decade earlier, the OCHCR created the position of the Special 
Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia 
and Related Intolerance.
315
 The Rapporteur examines all forms of discrimination 
globally and works closely with UN bodies to strengthen mechanisms to combat it. Like 
the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, the Rapporteur on 
Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related 
Intolerance conducts country visits to assess the situation and requests individual 
governments to respond to complaints. On March 28, 2008, the mandate of the 
Rapporteur was extended to 2011. In the next two years or so, the Rapporteur will focus 
their attention on issues such as episodes of discrimination against migrants, refugees and 
asylum-seekers and other minorities, best practices in the elimination of discrimination 
and right-wing political formations that incite hatred, racism, and xenophobia.     
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In Europe, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) 
is a pan-European human rights‘ monitoring body set up in 1993 that examines issues 
relating to intolerance including racism and xenophobia. In 1997, The European Union 
created the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) as an 
independent body to examine the phenomena and manifestations of racism, xenophobia 
and related forms of intolerance like anti-Semitism. The principal objectives of EUMC 
were to analyze the causes, consequences and effects of these phenomena, develop 
strategies to counter these processes and document examples of good practices on 
migrant integration in EU member states. On 15 February 2007, EUMC was re-named as 
the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA).
316
 In order to collect 
information and document the process nationally, the EUMC/FRA created the European 
Information Network on Racism and Xenophobia (RAXEN) in 2000. The Network 
consists of twenty-five Nodal Focal Points or NFPs, one in each member state. The 
NFPs work with a variety of agencies to collect information, including data, reports and 
analysis, for FRA. Some of the main activities of RAXEN include the production of 
country reports, special analysis and the provision of critical information to European 
institutions and FRA. Each year, the NFPs produce a country report documenting racism 
and discrimination in five thematic areas, namely, employment, housing, education, 
legislation, and racist crime and violence.    
 
On December 7, 2004, the African Commission on Human and People‘s Rights 
passed the resolution to establish a Special Rapporteur on Refugees, Asylum Seekers, 
Migrants and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa.
317
 Among the main 
responsibilities of the Commissioner are to carry out studies and activities to enhance the 
protection of refugees and migrants on the continent. The Special Rapporteur also assists 
Member States of the African Union to establish policies and mechanisms to better 
protect refugees and migrant communities. S/he reports on the state of refugees and 
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migrants in Africa at the sessions of the African Commission. The mandate of the Special 
Commissioner was renewed for two years on November 23, 2007. 
 
The NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa‘s Development) peer review 
mechanism has also provided the opportunity for some states, including South Africa, to 
be singled out for their poor treatment of migrants and refugees.  The South African Peer 
Review Report noted that ‗foreigners, mostly of African descent, are being subjected to 
brutality and detention.‘318 Xenophobia was increasing and should be ‗nipped in the bud.‘ 
In its response, South Africa countered that ‗the assertion that illegal immigrants are 
subject to brutal and inhuman treatment is strongly disputed.‘319 In South Africa, the 
reports and investigations of international and local human rights organizations including, 
notably, the state-funded South African Human Rights Commission, reached very 
different conclusions.
320
  
 
4.  Political Leadership 
 
Governments worldwide are not noted for their willingness to embrace the idea 
that citizens are intolerant of foreigners or xenophobic.  President Mbeki‘s denial that 
South Africa‘s month of violence against foreign nationals had anything to do with 
xenophobia is simply one example.  More often, political leadership is completely mute 
or anxious to deflect blame on to migrants themselves.  There are few countries in the 
world where a majority of the population favours immigration or is favourably disposed 
to ‗strangers in our midst.‘  What marks out those who have begun to address the 
problem is a willingness on the part of political leaders to condemn intolerance and 
xenophobic action, to highlight the benefits of migration, to defend migrant rights and to 
introduce social and cultural policies that foster social cohesion and celebrate diversity.  
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Regrettably, these examples are few and far between.  In many more cases, there are 
political parties that make political hay out of the presence of foreign migrants and the 
‗threat‘ they pose to citizens.  In countries such as those considered in this paper, there is 
a further problem that demands more than a rhetorical political response to xenophobia.  
Very often it is the actions and words of politicians and officials that deliberately or 
inadvertently promote an atmosphere of suspicion and hostility.  States have employees 
and when those employees are themselves xenophobic, the opportunities for abuse and 
exploitation multiply.      
 
5.  Xenophobia and the Law 
 
The Aliens Control Act of 1991 in South Africa set the direction and tone of post-
apartheid migration policy right up until the passage of the 2002 Immigration Act.  To the 
extent that the new Act duplicated the provisions of the old, it failed to provide a clean 
break with that past.  Throughout the 1990s, the Department of Home Affairs was 
constantly in court facing challenges to its application of the law (and usually losing). 
That losing trend has continued since 2002.  In recent months, the Grahamstown High 
Court overturned the decision of the Department of Home Affairs to deny a work permit 
to a Zimbabwean teacher as an ‗illustrious example of litigation (that) was instituted for 
the purpose of simply abusing the due process of law.‘  The Minister was ordered to pay 
compensation for the loss of salary and the cost of 11 two-hour taxi rides to government 
offices.
321
  In January 2009, eleven victims of xenophobic violence filed a claim for R5.7 
million in damages and an ‗unconditional apology‘ from the authorities for 
discrimination during the attacks and subsequent investigation of May 2008.
322
  The 
vigorous independence of the South African judiciary means that the case will receive a 
full and proper hearing. 
 
In many countries where xenophobia is rampant, complaints against the authorities would 
receive short shrift.  Migrants see the legal system as complicit in their exploitation and 
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abuse and would certainly not think of going to the courts for relief.  Yet, the power of 
legal challenges to xenophobia should not be underestimated.  In a rare example of ‗good 
practice,‘ the Parliament in Côte d‘Ivoire adopted a new Anti-Xenophobia Law in 
August 2008 to counter conduct and activities that incite xenophobic violence and 
tribalism.
323
 The law‘s preamble openly recognizes that such actions are divisive and 
damaging to social harmony as they ‗weaken national unity and cohesion.‘ It imposes 
stringent punishment on perpetrators including incarceration (five to ten years‘ sentence) 
and fines (from $1200 to $12,000). Stiffer penalties are to be imposed on those found 
guilty of inciting such acts by way of the media (radio, television, or print media), 
Internet and during the course of a public demonstration or political rally. 
 
6.  Media Analysis and Education 
 
The media is often complicit in building an atmosphere of mistrust and 
misinformation in countries of destination where xenophobia is a problem but they are 
also the first to hide behind the pretence of objectivity and facts-based reporting.  SAMP 
was publically denounced in 2008 by the South African Press Association (SAPA) for its 
claim that SAPA was guilty of uncritically reproducing negative stereotypes of migrants.  
SAPA threatened legal action with a counter-claim that all its reporting was ―facts-based‖ 
and ―neutral.‖  To prove its case, SAMP undertook a more systematic analysis of the 
SAPA news archive and demonstrated that the problem of biased and inflammatory 
reporting at the press association was even more serious than originally thought.  
 
As this paper has demonstrated, ―bad practice‖ and sensationalist media reporting 
and stereotyping of migrants is a pervasive problem in the global North and South.  In 
countries where racist language would be considered abhorrent and even illegal, 
xenophobic stereotyping and imagery (often with racial undertones) seem perfectly 
acceptable.   Media analysis is a critical first step but needs to be followed up with 
systematic and coordinated education for journalists and editors. 
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In the global South, radio and TV, not the print media, remain the main source of 
information for many.  In Southern Africa, SAMP targeted community radio chat shows 
for its public education series on migration issues.  The response from the public was 
good but there was no funding for ongoing programming so the long-term impact was 
probably small.  National, state-funded broadcasters were less willing to air the series 
although state radio in South Africa did carry a great deal of condemnatory commentary 
on the xenophobic violence of May 2008. 
 
6. Public Education 
 
Public education, in the media, in communities, in schools and in workplaces, is a 
critical antidote to the poison of xenophobia.  In South Africa, such initiatives have been 
initiated by civil society and international organizations, often in partnership.   In the late 
1990s, a multi-partner initiative to highlight the problem of xenophobia included the 
South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), National Consortium of Refugee 
Affairs (NCRA), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and 
several civil society groups including the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP). 
As a result, the Rollback Xenophobia (RBX) Campaign was launched in South Africa 
in December 1998.
324
 Through its programs, it aimed to counter increasing levels of anti-
migrant hostility in the country directed at African migrants and asylum-seekers. The 
RBX campaign was the outcome of a series of consultative conferences attended by the 
SAHRC and other migrant or rights advocacy groups including that on 15 October 1998 
when the Braamfontein Statement on Xenophobia was drafted. The Statement 
unequivocally stated: ‗South Africa needs to send a strong message that an irrational 
prejudice and hostility towards non-nationals is not acceptable under any 
circumstances‘.325   
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A plan of action was adopted by the RBX which would identify six priority areas: 
condition and rights of refugees; violence against migrant hawkers; migrant human 
rights‘ violations; role of education; the attitude and actions of government staff towards 
migrants, especially Home Affairs and police officers; and finally, the representation of 
migrant issues in the South African media.
326
 Special training programs were devised for 
South African Police Services personnel, including border and community police, 
educating them on the rights of migrants and refugees.
327
 Similarly, several media 
sensitization workshops and seminars were held to encourage more balanced coverage of 
immigration in the press as well as to enhance journalists‘ understanding of 
displacement-inducing conflicts in the region.
328
 Literature such as pamphlets, posters 
and a magazine, special radio programs like the ‗Once We were There‘ series 
documenting the experiences of 10 South African exiles, and a national photography 
project ‗Soutra: Images of Refuge‘ (Soutra refers to peace and protection in Madeng, a 
dialect spoken in West Africa) involving refugees were other highlights of the 
campaign.
329
  
 
The RBX campaign ran out of funding in 2002 and the promise of the initiative 
was never realised.   It was not until the horrific, large-scale attacks on migrants and 
refugees six years later that civil society mobilized.   A coalition of over 20 South 
African NGOs formed the Western Cape Emergency Civil Society Task Team and 
activated the No to Xenophobia emergency mobile phone SMS network. Based on the 
idea that ‗South Africa belongs to all those who live in it,‘ residents and citizens were 
asked to condemn the violence by sending text messages, report incidents of violence to 
the network (who would inform authorities), and to help victims and those displaced by 
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the assaults through donations of food and blankets.
330
 At the same time, a collective of 
South African independent and other film-makers launched the group Filmmakers 
against Racism (FAR).
331
 To date, FAR has produced a series of short documentaries 
and public service announcements (PSAs) documenting the violence and experiences of 
those affected by it. The documentaries and PSAs produced by FAR have been broadcast 
by the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC).  
 
Likewise, the Sonke Gender Justice Network, a South African NGO, organized a 
One Man Can Street Soccer Festival against Xenophobia in Khayelitsha outside Cape 
Town in July 2008.
332
 The underlying message of the event was that ‗one person can halt 
xenophobia, stop violence, support reintegration, celebrate diversity, demand justice and 
make a difference‘.333 Fourteen teams consisting of equal numbers of citizens and 
immigrants participated in this festival that attempted to enhance social contact and 
rapport between migrant and non-migrant communities.
334
  
 
In September 2008, the African Diaspora Forum (ADF) helped to launch an 
Adopt a Country Initiative in schools in Alexandra, an informal township near 
Johannesburg believed to be the starting point for the May 2008 anti-immigrant riots.
335
 
Schools in this area have adopted each of the 54 African countries and school-children 
are being taught their history, topography, customs, culture and food in an attempt to 
promote tolerance and appreciation towards other communities.      
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The effectiveness of these civil society interventions has yet to be assessed but the 
problem of xenophobic attitudes is so deeply entrenched that piecemeal and under-funded 
initiatives are unlikely to make much of a dent.  The state should also take a lead in 
recognizing and rooting out xenophobia in its own ranks. The likelihood of that 
happening is diminishing further as the shock of May 2008 recedes. President Mbeki‘s 
disavowal that the violence was xenophobic in character meant that what little 
momentum there was in government to understand and address the causes of xenophobia 
seemed to be lost. 
 
Elsewhere, the Council of Europe for Diversity, Human Rights and Participation 
(CoE) in partnership with the European Commission and the European Youth Forum, 
created the All Different, All Equal Campaign which was carried out in 2006-07 in 42 
member states.
336
 Following on from an older program conducted during the mid-1990s 
and using the same slogan and theme, the campaign sought to promote respect for 
diversity and promote greater understanding about human rights and discrimination based 
on the general idea that all human beings are equal despite differences in appearance and 
cultural beliefs.  
 
Speak out against Discrimination is a new program instituted by the CoE in 
2008 that seeks to bolster the role of the media in fighting all forms of prejudice and 
discrimination, including Islamophobia and intolerance towards Roma.
337
  A training-kit 
and virtual resource centre for journalists, book on anti-discrimination policies and CoE 
guidelines, television and radio spots for free broadcasting, and other material on cultural 
diversity, tolerance and the role of the media are to be prepared.
 338
 It is anticipated that 
the program will result in the formation of a Collective of Friends, a group of media 
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organizations and journalists who will actively promote inter-cultural dialogue in 
Europe.
339
     
 
Another CoE program, Dosta! Go beyond Prejudice, Discover the Roma 
Campaign (taken from the Romani word meaning ‗Enough‘) promotes the social 
inclusion of Roma peoples in Europe.
340
 In 2007, the Congress of Regional and Local 
Authorities of the Council of Europe instituted a new Dosta! Congress Prize for 
Municipalities in South Eastern European countries that actively advance the protection 
and inclusion of Roma peoples.
341
 Other activities of the campaign include: a CD of 
Roma music titled ‗Music beyond prejudice: Romani variations on the European 
Anthem‘; a ‗School and Civil Society Awards‘ for NGOs and educational institutions in 
the Western Balkans; a Public Service Announcement/TV spot on the Roma peoples; a 
media training program on Roma culture and traditions in Serbia; ‗Art Against 
Stereotypes‘ Festival in Tirana, Albania on 5-7 April, 2007 to celebrate International 
Roma Day; a conference on ‗Romaphobia and Anti-Gypsyism‘ organized in 
collaboration with the Forum of European Roma Young People (FERYP), and the ‗Roma 
are Europe‘ Summer Camp and Roma Youth Festival in Ohrid, Macedonia.342    
 
In Ukraine, a new program, Diversity Initiative (DIN), was set up in April 2007 
by the UNHCR, Amnesty International, IOM and other NGOs after numerous episodes of 
xenophobic attacks on African migrants.
343
 Conceived as a network of organizations that 
get together on a regular basis for strategy meetings organized by the IOM and UNHCR, 
DIN has contributed to the creation of an inter-agency anti-xenophobia working group 
chaired by the State Committee of Nationalities and Religions as well as a public service 
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announcement on tolerance screened on MTV, and to be broadcast regionally. DIN has 
provided input into a new government White Paper on Ukrainian and European anti-
discrimination legislation. The initiative maintains a database of xenophobic episodes 
based on information provided by members and other bodies.
344
 So far, more than forty 
organizations, including business, civil groups, international, and government bodies 
have joined the campaign.   
Conclusion 
Xenophobia is a generalized problem that accompanies large-scale migration, in 
both its legal and irregular manifestations.  Its impact is pernicious and overt, poisoning 
social interactions between locals and foreigners, licensing abuse and exploitation of 
migrants, and undermining the positive development outcomes of migration.  The key 
paradox appears to be that good policies and practices often do not seem to enable 
positive opinions and mitigate xenophobia.  In many cases, this is explicable because of 
the unwillingness of countries to admit that they even have a problem. Cash-strapped 
NGO‘s and civil society organizations attempt to fill the breach with piecemeal programs 
that have some local impact but often put them on a direct collision course with the 
authorities.  In other countries, the effectiveness of anti-xenophobia measures is 
compromised by the crisis-driven nature of the response.  Once the crisis is over, as in 
South Africa, enthusiasm for addressing the causes begins to wane.  In situations where 
xenophobic attitudes are deeply entrenched and pervasive, there is no quick fix.  A 
sustained and coordinated response over a considerable time period may be necessary.   If 
the South African Human Rights Commission‘s Roll Back Xenophobia campaign had not 
shut its doors in 2002, it is just possible that the outrage of May 2008 would have been 
avoided.   The various elements of such a response are discussed in the previous section 
of the paper.  The crucial elements of that response include a coordinated comparative 
applied research program to measure xenophobia and evaluate the effectiveness of 
interventions; subscription to global and regional normative standards; monitoring of 
                                                 
344
 UN in Ukraine 2008 ‗International organizations and Ukrainian human rights groups voice concern over 
the murder of a Nigerian national in Kyiv‘, http://www.un.org.ua/en/news/2008-06-03/ (Last accessed 
December 2008) 
 89 
xenophobic actions at the national, national and sub-national levels; political leadership 
and will; media education; and public education campaigns.  All of these initiatives have 
been tried in piecemeal and ad hoc fashion.  What is required, if the development 
potential and gains of migration for destination and source countries are not to be 
undermined by xenophobia, is a more coordinated and systematic effort to understand 
and act.  Governments on their own, even if they had the will, are unlikely to solve this 
growing threat.  
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